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TAXATION WITHOUT INFORMATION:
THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN
TAX COLLECTION
Wei Cui*
ABSTRACT:
A prominent strand of recent economic and legal scholarship
hypothesizes that third-party information reporting (TPIR) is essential to
modern tax collection. The slogan, “no taxation without information,” has
captured researchers’ imaginations and is even often presented as selfevident truth. This Article offers a fundamentally different perspective,
arguing that the emphasis on TPIR is misplaced. TPIR is used largely in the
collection of the personal income tax but not of many other types of modern
taxes. Even for the personal income tax, TPIR also has close substitutes
which do not involve information transmission to the government.
Theoretically, appeals to TPIR are vitiated by the puzzle of payor
compliance. And most purported empirical evidence for the effectiveness of
TPIR fails to provide causal identification.
I suggest that to better understand the institutional foundations of
modern tax collection, we should stop thinking of business firms as “fiscal
intermediaries” in a game of deterrence against tax evaders. Instead, it would
be more fruitful to conceive of firms as sites of social cooperation under the
rule of law. The co-evolution of the business firm and modern regulatory
law may have enabled modern governments to practice precisely “taxation
without information.”
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INTRODUCTION
Successfully raising tax revenue is a defining mark of the “state
capacity” of advanced economies.1 Building effective tax administration is
1. See Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, The Origins of State Capacity: Property
Rights, Taxation, and Politics, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1218, 1218 (2009) (commenting on state
capacity to raise taxes) and sources cited in note 1 therein; Mark Dincecco, The Rise of
Effective States in Europe, 75 J. ECON. HIST. 901 (2015) (explaining that “effective” states
“have the extractive capacity to gather enough revenues, and the productive capacity to better
channel public funds”). For the thesis that modern “state capacity” helps to explain the
divergent paths of economic development of nations, see generally TIMOTHY BESLEY &
TORSTEN PERSSON, PILLARS OF PROSPERITY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT
CLUSTERS (2011) (explaining that economic development has long been attributed not just to
rising incomes, but also to state effectiveness); Daron Acemoglu, Politics and Economics in
Weak and Strong States, 52 J. MONETARY ECON. 1199 (2005) (summarizing that a weak state
capacity and lack of taxation power can lead to the problems of less developed nations);
Pranab Bardhan, State and Development: The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current
Literature, 54 J. ECON. LIT. 862 (2016) (taking a broad look at the developmental goals of the
state).
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one of the most urgent tasks facing the poorer countries of the world in their
pursuit of sustainable development.2 These ideas have recently fueled
extraordinary policy initiatives among many nations, as well as become the
focus of cutting-edge research in political economy, public economics,
economic history, and related branches of the social sciences.3 In 2015, the
one hundred and ninety three United Nations (U.N.) Member States reached
two comprehensive agreements, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda4 and the
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.5 Both agendas committed “to
enhancing revenue administration through modernized, progressive tax
systems, improved tax policy and more efficient tax collection. . . . [and in
particular to] strengthen international cooperation to support efforts to build
capacity in developing countries . . . .”6 A slew of major international
projects were launched on the sidelines of the Addis Ababa Conference and
in its aftermath, involving the coordination of international organizations
that previously operated separately in this policy area.7 In the meantime,
2. See U.N., Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on
Financing for Development, U.N. DIVISION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., https://sustainablede
velopment.un.org/frameworks/addisababaactionagenda [hereinafter Addis Ababa Action]
[https://perma.cc/WYH2-5LGF] (explaining that “significant additional domestic public
resources. . . . will be critical to realizing sustainable development and achieving the
sustainable development goals”). See generally, Michael Keen, Taxation and Development—
Again (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 12/220, 2012) (explaining how tax and
development issues have been a primary concern of the IMF); INT’L MONETARY FUND,
CURRENT CHALLENGES IN REVENUE MOBILIZATION: IMPROVING TAX COMPLIANCE (2015),
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2015/020215a.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4CA-RDTG]
(stating that achieving tax compliance has been a priority for the developing world).
3. See, e.g., Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, Taxation and Development, in 5
HANDBOOK OF PUB. ECON. 51 (A. J. Auerbach et al. eds., 2013) (asking how countries move
to raise a greater percentage of their GDP from taxes); Daron Acemoglu & James A.
Robinson, Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in
Historical Perspective, 115 Q. J. ECON. 1167 (2000) (looking at how extending voting rights
relates to future wealth redistribution); Dincecco, supra note 1 (highlighting how tax
collection leads to successful state development); Henrik J. Kleven et al., Why Can Modern
Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries, 83
ECONOMICA 219 (2016) [hereinafter KKS] (looking at how third party information reporting
increases tax enforcement).
4. U.N., supra note 2.
5. U.N., Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, U.N.
DIVISION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015
/transformingourworld [https://perma.cc/8DER-NY9M].
6. U.N., supra note 2, art 2, 22.
7. For example, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) launched the Tax Inspectors
Without Borders project to “help developing countries bolster domestic revenues by
strengthening their tax audit capacities.” Press Release, United Nations, Tax Inspectors
without Borders: OECD and UNDP to Work with Developing Countries to Make Tax Audits
More Effective (July 13, 2015). Moreover, the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary
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questions such as why developing countries tax so little and how developed
countries can tax so much now draw the attention of some of the most
innovative and influential social scientists.8 These intellectual developments
can be seen as complementary to the global policy initiatives: if raising tax
revenue is indeed crucial to the path to prosperity for all nations in the world,
a framework for understanding the institutional foundations of modern tax
collection is clearly in order.
Much of the recent, highly prominent social science research on the
underpinnings of the tax collection capacity of advanced economies has
converged on a simple, seemingly obvious line of reasoning. To collect tax,
the government needs information about the taxable income, transactions,
and other tax attributes of taxpayers. But the government is always in a
situation of information asymmetry vis-à-vis taxpayers: the latter always
have incentives to hide such information. The government’s ability to
overcome such information asymmetry therefore must be crucial for tax
collection. And, scholars seem to believe, the most powerful way by which
such asymmetry has been overcome is through third-party information

Fund (IMF) also launched a new initiative to help developing countries strengthen their tax
systems. Press Release, Int’l Monetary Fund, World Bank and the IMF Launch Joint Initiative
to Support Developing Countries in Strengthening Tax Systems, U.N. Press Release No.
15/330 (July 10, 2015), https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr15330
[https://perma.cc/FP6C-6MJP]. The International Tax Compact launched The Addis Tax
Initiative, in which over 30 countries and international organizations teamed up to strengthen
international cooperation in strengthening tax administration, and in which participants
commit to “collectively double their technical cooperation in the area of domestic revenue
mobilisation and taxation by 2020.” Press Release, Int’l Tax Compact, On the Occasion of
the Launch of the ADDIS TAX INITIATIVE (July 15, 2015) (available at
https://www.addistaxinitiative.net/documents/Addis-Tax-Initiative_Press-Release.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X65U-MVKC]). In October 2016, the second meeting of the signatories of
the Addis Tax Initiative was held in Paris, France. The meeting finalized the Work Plan for
2016/17, outlining the key priorities of the Addis Tax Initiative. Addis Tax Initiative, 2nd
Meeting of the Signatories of the Addis Tax Initiative, Paris, France, ADDIS TAX INITIATIVE
(Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.addistaxinitiative.net/#slider-2 [https://perma.cc/5C46-7XSG].
More recently, the OECD, IMF, WB and U.N. announced “The Platform for Collaboration
on Tax.” See IMF ET AL., The Platform for Collaboration on Tax: Concept Note (Working
Paper, 2016), https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2016/pdf/pr16176.pdf [https://
perma.cc/T694-VBEP] (describing a new platform for international collaboration on tax
issues). A report was prepared for the G20 Finance Ministers in the framework of the
Platform for Collaboration on Tax. See IMF ET AL., ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
EXTERNAL SUPPORT IN BUILDING TAX CAPACITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2016),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/enhancing-the-effectiveness-of-external-support-in-building-taxcapacity-in-developing-countries.pdf [https://perma.cc/593W-JZ2K] (recommending ways
countries can implement technical assistance programs and contribute funds for tax projects).
8. See, e.g., Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, Why Do Developing Countries Tax So
Little?, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 99 (2014); KKS, supra note 3; Henrik J. Kleven, How Can
Scandinavians Tax So Much?, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 77 (2014).
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reporting (“TPIR”).9 In the boldest formulation of this idea, Henrik Kleven,
Claus Kreiner, and Emmanuel Saez claim that TPIR is a defining feature of
modern taxation.10 In other words, mechanisms for transmitting taxpayer
information to the government represent the institutional foundations of
modern tax collection. To support this bold conjecture, a small but “rapidly
growing” empirical literature11 has emerged that claims to offer novel
evidence for the power of TPIR.12 The slogan, “no taxation without
information,” not only has captured researchers’ imaginations but is often
even presented as self-evident truth.13
Indeed, to many U.S. scholars and policymakers, this claim may seem
quite familiar. U.S. policymakers, for example, have long been interested in
narrowing the “tax gap,” or the discrepancy between the tax revenue that is

9. As the author of one widely-cited study that purports to provide empirical support
for this intuitive reasoning puts it:
A fundamental constraint for taxation is that governments need to be able to
observe transactions in order to impose a tax on them. A growing literature
therefore argues that understanding information flows is central to effective
taxation. When governments imperfectly observe transactions, important
differences emerge between forms of taxation that are equivalent in standard
models of taxation but differ in the information they generate for the government.
Third-party reporting, verifiable paper trails, and whistle-blowers are thought to
play an important role in facilitating tax enforcement.
Dina Pomeranz, No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the
Value Added Tax, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2539, 2539 (2015) (citations omitted).
10. KKS, supra note 3, at 219. See infra Part I.
11. The description of this empirical literature as “rapidly growing” is borrowed from
Joel Slemrod et al., Does Credit-Card Information Reporting Improve Small-Business Tax
Compliance?, 149 J. PUB. ECON. 1–19, 2 (2017), discussed in detail in Part III infra. For a
summary review, see Joel Slemrod, Tax Compliance and Enforcement: New Research and its
Policy Implications 34–42s.3.3 (Ross Sch. Bus., Working Paper No. 1302, 2016)
(summarizing various research on the evidence relating to third-party information gathering).
For examples of some widely cited studies, see Carrillo et al., Dodging the Taxman: Firm
Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement, 9(2) AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 144 (April
2017) (looking at the effects of non-credible tax enforcement when Ecuadorian firms were
notified of revenue discrepancies); Henrik J. Kleven, et al., Unwilling or Unable to Cheat?
Evidence from a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark, 79 ECONOMETRICA 651 (2011) (analyzing
a tax experiment where half the participants were audited and the rest were not); Pomeranz,
supra note 9 (emphasizing the importance of gathering information to collecting taxes);
Miguel Almunia & David Lopez-Rodriguez, Under the Radar: The Effect of Monitoring
Firms on Tax Compliance (Warwick Econ. Res., Paper Series No. 1070, 2015) (looking at the
tax compliance effect from firm activity information trails); Joana Naritomi, Consumers as
Tax Auditors (London Sch. Econ. & Pol. Sci., Working Paper, 2016) (investigating the
enforcement effect of the wider availability of third-party information gathering).
12. In this Article, I will use “information reporting,” “third-party reporting,” and
“TPIR” interchangeably.
13. Pomeranz, supra note 9.
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collected and the revenue that ought to be collected.14 And greater
information reporting has often been considered as a key approach to
achieving this goal.15 Although whether the scope of information reporting
should be expanded has been a matter of century-long debates,16 important
legislative actions taken in 2008 have given greater emphasis to TPIR. 17
Since 2011, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has required credit card
companies and payment settlement entities such as eBay to report payments
made to individuals and businesses.18 Financial institutions are also now
under the obligation to furnish information about the tax basis of securities
to taxpayers and the government to determine gains or losses on the sale of

14. See, e.g., Understanding the Tax Gap, IRS (Mar. 2005), https://www.irs.gov/new
sroom/understanding-the-tax-gap [https://perma.cc/6N4M-NRA6] (last updated Sept. 27,
2017) (explaining the components of the tax gap).
15. Both the economic and legal literatures on tax compliance in the United States are
very large and not possible to review here. For recent legal scholarship, see, e.g., Joseph
Bankman, Eight Truths About Collecting Taxes from the Cash Economy, 117 TAX NOTES 506
(2007) (focusing on how the cash economy relates to the problem of the tax gap); Leandra
Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is Information
Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733 (2010) [hereinafter Lederman, Reducing
Information Gaps] (proposing factors for evaluating information reporting requirements);
Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance,
60 STAN. L. REV. 695 (2007) [hereinafter Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps] (arguing that
tax law can and does promote compliance by implementing structural mechanisms such as
withholding taxes).
16. See, e.g., Anuj C. Desai, What a History of Withholding Tells Us About The
Relationship Between Statutes and Constitutional Law, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 859 (2014)
(viewing the relationship between statutes and constitutional law from the angle of a statute
that implemented tax withholding); Ajay K. Mehrotra, “From Contested Concept to
Cornerstone of Administrative Practice”: Social Learning and the Early History of U.S. Tax
Withholding, 7 COLUM. J. TAX. L. 144 (2016) (giving an overview of the development of tax
withholding); Joseph J. Thorndike, Wall Street, Washington, and the Business of Information
Reporting, 110 TAX NOTES 787 (Feb. 13, 2006), http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.
nsf/cf7c9c870b600b9585256df80075b9dd/a518ae7d8d5eaf23852571360068fc5e?opendocu
ment [https://perma.cc/9VWH-Z9GR] (giving an overview of the history of tax information
reporting in the U.S.).
17. See, e.g., Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §
403, 122 Stat. 3765, 3854–58 (2008) (imposing additional reporting requirements on brokers
for certain securities transactions); Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-289, § 3091(a), 122 Stat. 2654, 2908-11 (2008) (imposing an annual reporting
requirement on payment settlement entities who make reportable payment transactions in a
given calendar year).
18. I.R.C. § 6050W (2008). See infra Part III for a discussion of empirical literature
analyzing the impact of credit card and third-party settlement entity reporting. See also, ShuYi Oei & Diane M. Ring, The Tax Lives of Uber Drivers: Evidence from Internet Discussion
Forums, 8 COLUM. J. TAX L. 56 (2017) (looking at Uber drivers’ understandings of taxes and
deductions).
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securities.19 Proposals to further expand TPIR continue to be advanced.20
Most importantly, the ever-expanding computing capacities of modern
digital economies make the recording and transmission of transactional
information to tax collectors easier and easier, which in turn seems to
promise more effective government control of taxpayer information.21
This Article contributes to these vibrant intellectual and policy
discussions by offering a fundamentally different perspective. Much recent
scholarship, I argue, has mischaracterized the role of information reporting,
which has also led to increasing confusions about the institutional basis of
modern tax collection. To develop this perspective, I first engage in a debunking exercise, aimed at exposing weaknesses in the arguments and
evidence adduced for the importance of TPIR. I show that TPIR is largely
used in the collection of the personal income tax, and plays no role in most
other types of modern taxes.22 Moreover, although information reporting and
withholding are crucial to the collection of the personal income tax, to
portray them as overcoming pre-existing information asymmetries between
the government and taxpayers relies on legal artifices.23 I also show that the
emphasis on TPIR fails to explain why payors specifically, and business
organizations generally, would comply with the tax law.24 In particular, the
prevalent belief that payor withholding or information reporting generates
self-enforcing compliance dynamics is both practically unconvincing and
theoretically naïve. Finally, most purported evidence for the effectiveness
of TPIR is based on flawed empirical inferences.25
These de-bunking arguments demonstrate that TPIR cannot play the
explanatory role that social scientists have assigned it: at least until the
present, giving governments effective access to taxpayer information
through third parties does not explain the success of modern tax
administration. The arguments highlight previously neglected weaknesses
in an apparent scholarly consensus: what many social scientists are
increasingly coming to use as “stylized facts” (to motivate further theorizing
and empirical work) actually involve grave misconceptions about the basis

19. I.R.C. § 6045(g) (2015).
20. See, e.g., James Alm & Jay A. Soled, Improving Tax Basis Reporting for
Passthrough Entities, 143 TAX NOTES 809, 810 (May 19, 2014) (arguing that “the time has
come to extend basis reporting beyond marketable securities and to require pass-through
entities” to do the same).
21. Kleven, supra note 8, at 81 (“[T]he gradual transition from cash to credit card
transactions may eventually eliminate most tax evasion even for self-employed individuals.”);
James Alm & Jay A. Soled, W(h)ither the Tax Gap?, 92 WASH. L. REV. 521 (2017)
22. See infra Part I.
23. See infra Part II.A.
24. See infra Part II.B.
25. See infra Part II.C.
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of modern tax administration. This is the first major contribution of the
Article.
In a second set of arguments, I articulate a new way of looking at the
feasibility of TPIR, in terms of when information about the mutual identities
of market participants is likely to be transmitted through market
mechanisms. This perspective defines the limits of TPIR more sharply and
parsimoniously than previous approaches, and suggests that TPIR will tend
to be incomplete with respect to business income.26 I illustrate this
perspective through an important recent study of the effect of TPIR by credit
card companies on U.S. taxpayers,27 and, drawing on the same study, provide
an explanation of how the incompleteness of TPIR renders it an ineffective
tool in limiting tax evasion.28 This is the second major contribution of the
Article.
Finally, I suggest that to better understand the institutional foundations
of modern tax collection, we should stop thinking of business firms as “fiscal
intermediaries” in a game of deterrence against tax evaders. Instead, it would
be more fruitful to conceive of firms as sites of social cooperation under the
rule of law. If firms enable social cooperation, but do so only with the
support of a legal system, then compliance with law in business operations
can often be expected. There need not be anything special about compliance
with tax law in particular, and any valid explanation of why firms comply
with the tax law is unlikely to be distinct from explanations of the
phenomenon of business compliance with the law in general.29 I argue that
this explanatory strategy is more consistent with the history of modern
taxation — in particular, the fact that labor and workplace regulations were
implemented well before the adoption of information reporting — than
explaining tax compliance in terms of TPIR. The third major contribution
of the Article is thus to put tax compliance into the context of business
compliance with the law in general, and connecting both with the theory of
the firm.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I presents some important
historical facts that have emboldened economists to hypothesize that TPIR
is the linchpin of modern taxation. It then contrasts this bold hypothesis with
a much more cautious view, which holds TPIR to be a derivative
phenomenon. Part II offers a series of arguments for the latter view,
identifying weaknesses in both the conceptual arguments and empirical
evidence for the relevance of TPIR. Part III sets out a new theory about the
limitation of information reporting, and shows how this theory is consistent
26.
27.
28.
29.

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.C.
See Part V infra.
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with recent empirical evidence from the U.S. on the limited impact of TPIR.
Parts IV and V then contrast the conceptions of firms as “fiscal
intermediaries” and as sites of social cooperation. Part IV highlights the
inadequacies of the former. Part V sketches out the latter conception and its
promise both in terms of historical plausibility and theoretical coherence.
Part VI briefly discusses some of the policy implications of the arguments in
Parts I-V. A brief conclusion then follows.
I.

INFORMATION REPORTING: THE LINCHPIN OF MODERN
TAXATION?

Political economists who view taxation as a core component of modern
state capacity emphasize that richer countries tax more, and any given
country tends to tax more as it gets richer.30 In a recent, influential paper,
Kleven, Kreiner and Saez (abbreviated below as “KKS”) show that these
patterns are driven entirely by countries’ adoption of what they call “modern
taxes.”31 They include in the definition of “modern taxes” personal and
corporate income taxes, the value-added tax (VAT), and payroll taxes and
social security contributions.32 By contrast, “traditional taxes” are defined
as all other taxes, including property taxes, inheritance taxes, excise and sales
taxes, custom duties, etc.33 Examining data from 2005 regarding 29 OECD
countries and 43 non-OECD countries, they show that there exists a clear
positive correlation between (i) GDP per capita and (ii) the ratio of revenue
from modern taxes to GDP, but there is no correlation between GDP per
capita and the ratio of revenue to GDP from traditional taxes34 (see Figure 1
below). Further, using data for 14 advanced economies over a 160-year time
horizon, they show that again, the growth in tax revenue in these countries
over time is driven entirely by growth in “modern taxes,” with no long-run
increase (and typically a weak decline) in “traditional taxes” (see Figure 2
below).

30. Besley & Persson, supra note 8, at 102; Besley & Persson, supra note 3, at 56; KKS,
supra note 3, at 221; Kleven, supra note 8, at 77-78.
31. KKS, supra note 3, at 223.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id. (“[T]he relationship between taxes and development across countries is
driven by a stark variation in tax structure across countries.”) (emphasis in the original).
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Figure 1: Correlations between GDP and Revenue from “Modern” and
“Traditional” Taxes35

KKS offer an interpretation for these historical patterns that has
gained great popularity among political economists studying tax
administration.36 They postulate that in any country, the growth of tax
revenue is constrained by the enforceability of taxes, which depends on the
availability of taxpayer information to the government.37 All “modern taxes”
are basically taxes in respect of which the “enforceability constraint” has
been loosened or overcome, through the mechanism of “third-party
reporting.”38 By this latter term, KKS mean arrangements whereby firms act
as intermediaries to collect information about other taxpayers and transmit
such information to the government.39 They argue that when firms get
sufficiently large, they are more likely to act reliably as such intermediaries,
because the risk of firms’ being caught cheating increases as firm size
grows.40 Therefore, roughly speaking, they present a picture where the
growth of firm size in an economy causes “third-party reporting” to become
more reliable, which in turn makes taxes more enforceable, and the optimal
level of taxation more achievable.
That large firms tend to be more compliant with the tax law (and
other types of law) is an important, but not uncommon, observation.41 What

35. Id. at 224.
36. See sources cited supra note 11.
37. KKS, supra note 3, at 219-20.
38. Id.
39. This thesis is also advanced in Wojciech Kopczuk & Joel Slemrod, Putting Firms
into Optimal Tax Theory, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 130 (2006).
40. For a critique of this aspect of KKS, see infra Part IV.
41. See, e.g., Alm & Soled, supra note 21, at 543-47 (observing that the workforce has
concentrated in large firms, where tax compliance is high). KKS show, using recent data from
50 countries, that tax revenue and share of workforce in large firms are positively correlated
across countries. KKS, supra note 3, at 225–26.

CUI FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

9/27/2018 3:26 PM

2017] INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN TAX COLLECTION

103

KKS’s theory adds to such observation is the contention that this matters for
the capacity of governments to collect tax revenue because it helps solve a
pre-existing problem of information asymmetry, i.e. the government’s lack
of information about ultimate taxpayers such as individual income-earners.42
Figure 2: Revenue Composition over Time for Select Countries43

Other scholars have recently offered explanations of modern tax
compliance in a similar spirit. That is, they first postulate information
asymmetry as the most important kind of enforceability constraint for taxes,
and then identify exogenously given types of economic development that
relax such constraint. For example, Anders Jensen claims that because
economically more developed countries have larger sectors of formal
employment, they are able to make greater use of TPIR (with respect to wage
income), and therefore more successfully overcome the information
asymmetry vis-à-vis taxpayers.44 Roger Gordon and Wei Li argue that since
tax collection depends on audits and the effectiveness of audits depends on

42. KKS also provide a theory of why large firms are more compliant that focuses on
the increasing risk of being exposed by whistle-blowers. KKS, supra note 3, at 220. Part IV
infra argues, on the contrary, that many other explanations may be at play and are much more
relevant.
43. Id. at 225. KKS provide comparable historical information for other industrial
economies in the Online Appendix to their article.
44. Anders Jensen, Employment Structure and the Rise of the Modern Tax System (Nov.
2015) (unpublished working paper) (available at https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/f
iles/TSE/documents/sem2016/jobmarket/jmp_jensen.pdf [https://perma.cc/2H57-PUQP]).
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the existence of paper trails, the level of development of a country’s financial
sector will substantially determine the country’s capacity of tax collection.45
However, while the purported centrality of TPIR to modern tax
compliance has become commonplace among many scholars, careful
reflection suggests that the above evidence is actually consistent with
opposite view, namely that the use of TPIR is quite limited in tax
administration in advanced economies. To start, there is no obvious way in
which the corporate income tax is enforced through TPIR. Corporations
report income and deductions largely on the basis of their own accounting
records. This is illustrated in the United States by regulatory rules that
specifically exempt corporations from information reporting requirements
that are applicable to payments to individuals: businesses that purchase
services worth more than $600 a year from a service provider generally need
to report such payments to the IRS, but not if the provider is a corporation.46
The same corporate exemption applies to the payment of interest and
dividends.47
The value added tax (VAT), which is a large source of revenue in
most countries (although not in the U.S., which has not adopted a VAT), also
does not involve information reporting.48 Under the VAT, firms—which are
nominally the taxpayers—charge VAT on goods and services sold to other
firms and to individuals, and firms engaged in businesses may claim tax
credits for the VAT that they have been charged on input purchases.49 They
then remit any net VAT amount—tax charged on sales minus input tax
credits—to the government (hence the term “value added”). However, firms
generally do not transmit information about payments to and specific
transactions with vendors and customers to the government, but instead
aggregate transaction information into lines on simple tax returns.50

45. Roger Gordon & Wei Li, Tax Structures in Developing Countries: Many Puzzles and
a Possible Explanation, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 855 (2009). Gordon and Li view financial
institutions primarily as the depository of information to which the government may have
access, rather than intermediaries that automatically transmit such information to the
government. However, the literature on TPIR (cited in note 11 supra) has treated Gordon and
Li’s work as reaching kindred conclusions. See infra Part IV for a critique of conceptions of
the firm both as intermediaries and as depositories of information.
46. Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-3(p)(1) (2017).
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-4(c)(1)(ii)(A) (2017).
48. KKS acknowledge this point in an endnote, but refer to the fact that the VAT creates
a paper trail. KKS, supra note 3, at 242–43 n.8. The existence of a paper trail does help
audits, but it does not automatically provide the government with any information before an
audit. Cf. Alm & Soled 2016, supra note 21 (contrasting information reporting and audits).
49. See generally ALAN SCHENK ET AL., VALUE ADDED TAX: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH
1–46 (2d ed. 2015) (giving a general overview and history of the VAT).
50. See generally id. at 92–186 (examining the supply chain and tax credits in the VAT
context).
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The prevalence of TPIR is really most pronounced in the individual
income tax context, and only for wage and passive investment income. U.S.
workers, for example, receive W-2 forms each year from their employers
regarding their wage income and the federal, state as well as social security
taxes that have been withheld from such income. U.S. investors receive 1099
forms regarding their dividend, interest, capital gain, and certain other types
of passive investment income. Social security and pension payments, which
one can also think of as forms of passive investment income, are subject to
TPIR as well. These types of income represent a very substantial portion of
the U.S. individual income tax base, and therefore TPIR may appear to be
thoroughly built into the tax. But, in reality, that is not the case. The
practical and political difficulties of extending information reporting beyond
the contexts of employment and passive investment income are wellknown.51 The most important examples of information reporting outside
these contexts are the long-standing requirement to report business payments
made to independent contractors providing services,52 and the much more
recent requirements for credit card companies and other payment settlement
entities to report sales settled by non-cash means.53 The effectiveness of
these two types of information reporting is still controversial; Part III infra
will specifically review recent empirical evidence for the (in)effectiveness
of credit-card reporting. But few would disagree that TPIR with respect to
individual business income is largely incomplete.54
Overall, therefore, it is fair to say that TPIR is used very little in the
corporate income tax, VAT, and the taxation of individual business income,
while it is used with respect to an individual’s wage and passive financial
income. Even in the United States, which relies on the personal income tax
for revenue to a much greater extent than other OECD countries,55 sales and
property taxes and corporate income taxes (none of which generally relies
51. See sources cited in note 16 supra (describing the long and difficult process of how
income tax withholding became accepted). See also, Joseph J. Thorndike, Do We Have a Tax
Compliance Crisis in Washington?, TAX HISTORY PROJECT (2009) (calling for all politicians
on Capitol Hill to release their tax returns); Joseph J. Thorndike, The Income Tax Is
Inquisitorial—Get Over It, TAX ANALYSTS BLOG (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.tax
analysts.org/tax-analysts-blog/income-tax-inquisitorial-get-over-it/2013/01/29/168416
[https://perma.cc/L6B8-XEUT] (describing Italy’s intrusive tax reporting measures and
explaining that income tax collection has always been somewhat intrusive).
52. I.R.C. § 6041(a) (2017).
53. I.R.C. § 6050W (2017).
54. See Bankman, supra note 15 (analyzing the underreporting and underpaying of tax
in the individual business sector); Carrillo et al., supra note 11 at 162 (concluding that some
Ecuadorian firms in a study may have preferred to underreport costs and remain in the
informal sector); Slemrod et al., supra note 11 (explaining that tax enforcement for small
businesses is more challenging than for large firms).
55. OECD, REVENUE STATISTICS 2016 - THE UNITED STATES (2016), available at
https://www.oecd.org/tax/revenue-statistics-united-states.pdf [https://perma.cc/JV82-Q3PJ].
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on TPIR) generate about 36% of total government revenue.56 Another 24%
of total government revenue comprises social security contributions, and as
discussed in Part II.A, at least half of this revenue (and maybe the entirety of
it) can be characterized as not involving TPIR.57 Thus emphasizing TPIR
seems to privilege, without obvious justification, (certain elements of) the
individual income tax. A more neutral characterization seems to be that it is
business organizations that play essential roles in collecting all modern taxes:
they are intermediaries (third parties) in respect of several types of taxable
individual income, but are taxpayers in their own right in respect both of
taxable individual business income and of other taxes.
This, however, is not how scholars — not just economists but also
legal scholars — have written about third-party reporting.58 The standard
view is that, first, TPIR is crucial for tax collection on wage and passive
financial income, and second, the practical limitations on third-party
reporting for other types of (individual taxable) income may be overcome,
when the cost of compliance can be sufficiently reduced.59 If this is correct,
the present limitations of TPIR are a matter of mere detail, while the power
of TPIR is the more basic “stylized fact” that is significant for social science.
In the following two Parts, I argue against this standard view in two
ways. Part II argues that TPIR is a derivative component in modern tax
administration. Part III offers an explanation of why information reporting
would generally not work outside the wage and passive investment income
context. The explanation implies that there are hard limits to the
completeness of information reporting, which in turn constrains its utility.
II.

INFORMATION REPORTING AS A DERIVATIVE INSTITUTION

To properly evaluate the significance of TPIR, three basic facts, to
which the existing literature has given inadequate attention, must be taken
into account. First, where it is applied in modern tax collection, TPIR often
has close substitutes that would not support the claim that tax collection is
conditioned on the transmission of taxpayer information to the government.60
These substitutes show that the dependence of taxation on information
transmission is an illusion.61 Second, the appeal to TPIR leaves it mysterious
why payors would comply with reporting obligations instead of colluding
with payees.62 Third, although some evidence for the effectiveness of TPIR
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. (computations based on 2013 and 2014 data).
See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.A for the discussion of legal scholars’ views on TPIR.
See infra Part III.A for the discussion of legal scholars’ views on TPIR.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
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is routinely cited, none of such evidence identifies the causal effect of TPIR
on compliance.63
A. The Illusion of Information Transmission
The effective use of information reporting in the income tax context
is observed mainly for wage and passive financial income. Reflection
suggests that these components of the individual income tax base are
distinctive in the following way: third parties — namely payors of wage,
dividend, interest, etc. — possess both near-complete information about the
specific items of income and control over their payment.64 But for any item
of income such that there is a payor that possesses both complete information
about it and control over its payment, information reporting is only one
among several ways in which the government can collect tax.
One clear alternative is final withholding. For example, under the
final withholding systems adopted in many European countries today,
employers simply deduct tax from wage payments, and employees do not
have to file income tax returns themselves.65 Similarly, banks paying interest
and corporations distributing dividends simply withhold tax on interest and
dividend payments at flat rates, without the need for individual taxpayers to
report the receipt of such payments.66 Under final withholding, even though
the recipients of income are nominally the taxpayers, they generally have no
compliance obligations with respect to the income subject to withholding.
Any information transmitted to the government simply helps the latter
determine whether the payors have performed withholding correctly. In
other words, third parties do not transmit information to the government in
order to help the latter monitor the compliance of ultimate taxpayers.
There is in fact a more complete substitute for information reporting.
For any item of income that could be subject to final withholding, an
equivalent tax can be imposed simply as an excise tax on the payer. In the
U.S., a contemporary example of this is the “social security taxes” imposed
by the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) portion of the Internal
Revenue Code.67 Under the FICA tax regime, taxes “with respect to

63. See infra Part II.C.
64. In Part II.D infra, I argue that it is specific economic conditions and legal
conventions that enable the individual income tax base to be built from these types of income.
65. For a comparative review of the practice of final withholding on wage income and
financial income, see U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, REP. TO THE CONG. ON RETURN-FREE TAX
SYSTEMS: TAX SIMPLIFICATION IS A PREREQUISITE (2003) [hereinafter RETURN-FREE
SYSTEMS] (conducting an examination of return-free systems in other countries).
66. Id. at 2, 7.
67. I.R.C. §§ 3101-3128.
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employment” consist of an “excise” tax on employers68 and an “income” tax
on employees,69 each of which is a percentage of the employees’ wages.
While the income tax on employees is required to “be collected by the
employer of the taxpayer, by deducting the amount of the tax from the wages
as and when paid,”70 the excise tax on employers is simply paid by employers
themselves. However, from the perspectives of the employer and of the
government, this distinction between the excise (employer) and withholding
(employee) portions of Social Security contribution is merely nominal. They
involve exactly the same calculations and remittance actions by the same
parties, namely employers.71 It is also generally believed that they have the
same economic incidence.72 Thus, although one can think of the withholding
tax (the “employee portion”) as involving the reporting by a third party (i.e.,
the employer) on the taxable wage of an ultimate taxpayer (i.e., the
employee), this characterization would not be applicable to the excise tax
that is administered in an identical fashion.
Indeed, the equivalence — from an enforcement perspective —
between a final withholding tax and an excise tax on the payor featured
prominently in the history of the U.S. tax system. The first U.S. withholding
tax, enacted by the 1862 Revenue Act, was applicable to (i) “the interest from
railroad company bonds and the dividends from railroad company stock[,]”
(ii) dividends paid by banks, trust companies, savings institutions, and
insurance companies, and (iii) salaries of federal government employees in
excess of 600 dollars per year.73 The nominal taxpayers for the tax — the
persons on whom the tax was imposed — were the payors, not the recipients,
of interest, dividends and salaries.74 Therefore, whether to label the 1862 tax
an excise tax on payors or a withholding tax on payees is a choice involving
little substance.75
Even more tellingly, the Civil War dividends tax led to the proposal
in 1894 of the first corporate income tax: because in the nineteenth century
corporations generally distributed most of their earnings as dividends, the

68. I.R.C. §§ 3111-3113.
69. I.R.C. §§ 3101-3102.
70. I.R.C. § 3102.
71. Desai, supra note 16, at 894.
72. See HARVEY ROSEN & TED GEYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 314-15 (8th ed. 2007) (showing
that excise and withholding portions of Social Security contribution have the same economic
incidence).
73. Desai, supra note 16, at 873-75.
74. Id. at 874. However, the payors of dividend and interest were “‘authorized and
required’” to “‘deduct and withhold from all payments made . . . the said duty or sum . . . .’”
Id. (emphasis in the original).
75. Because the nominal taxpayers were the payors themselves, the tax base of the
withholding tax was not treated as part of the income of individual recipients. Id. at 875-76.
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corporate income tax was little different from a tax on dividends.76 The
corporate income tax, that is, was a mutation from a withholding tax on
dividends. Although one could think of the corporate income tax as
involving information reporting on shareholders, it is uncommon to literally
refer to it as such.77 But this point also works the other way: although one
does not usually think of social security withholding on wage earners as an
excise tax on the employer, one certainly could, just as the Internal Revenue
Code explicitly labels the portion of FICA taxes imposed on employers.78
The underlying point is this: once a certain tax base is determined,
whom the statute designates as the taxpayer, payor or recipient, is to a
considerable extent a legal artifice.79 Where a “third party” possesses both
complete information regarding an item of income belonging to the tax base
and control over that item of income, then that third party can itself be made
76. See generally STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO SHIELD: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT (2010); Desai, supra note 16, at 882, n.107
(“T]he tax on corporate income was simply the Civil War dividends tax in a new guise. . . .
[T]he concept of ‘withholding’ of the stockholder’s income tax at source had taken a small
step toward the creation of a new and distinct concept: the corporate income tax.”) (citation
omitted).
77. Desai, supra note 16, at 882, n.107 (“Although there was a clear sense that taxing
the income of an individual owner of shares at the corporate level was primarily grounded on
the increased likelihood of collecting the tax, the idea that a corporate income tax was simply
a ‘withholding’ of the shareholders’ income eventually gave way.”) (citation omitted).
78. I.R.C., supra note 68.
79. The equivalence between a withholding tax on the recipient of a payment and an
excise tax on the payor is a well-known aspect of tax design and has many illustrations not
only in the U.S. but also in the tax systems of other countries. A contemporary example of a
tax on wage income imposed on employers is the Australian fringe benefits tax, imposed on
employers for in-kind compensation for employees. HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD,
COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2010), at Part II.B.1.
Each of South Africa, Sweden, France, and Belgium has enacted taxes on corporations on
their profit distributions that are the equivalent of withholding taxes on dividends. Juliana
Benamran, France - Corporate Taxation § 6.1, COUNTRY ANALYSES IBFD (July 21, 2016),
https://online.ibfd.org/kbase/#topic=doc&url=/collections/cta/html/cta_fr_chaphead.html&
WT.z_nav=Navigation [https://perma.cc/VD5N-RB7E]. Gauthier Cruysmans, Belgium Corporate Taxation § 6.1, COUNTRY ANALYSES IBFD (July 1, 2016), https://online.ibfd.
org/kbase/#topic=doc&url=/collections/cta/html/cta_be_chaphead.html&WT.z_n
av=Navigation [https://perma.cc/9W42-ADY5]. Johann Hattingh, South Africa - Corporate
Taxation § 1.1.3, COUNTRY ANALYSES IBFD (June 1, 2016), https://online.ibfd.org
/kbase/#topic=doc&url=/collections/cta/html/cta_za_chaphead.html&WT.z_nav=Navigatio
n [https://perma.cc/VXQ5-Y76K]. Emma Nilsson, Sweden - Corporate Taxation § 6.1,
COUNTRY ANALYSES IBFD (April 1, 2016), https://online.ibfd.org/kbase/#topic=doc&url=
/collections/cta/html/cta_se_chaphead.html&WT.z_nav=Navigation [https://perma.cc/R26EKK6Y]. Brazil has enacted excise taxes on payors of royalties to replace withholding taxes
with respect to royalty recipients. Fernando Tonanni & Bruno Gomes, Brazil - Corporate
Taxation § 14.6.4., COUNTRY ANALYSES IBFD (March 1, 2016), https://online.ibfd
.org/kbase/#topic=doc&url=/collections/cta/html/cta_br_chaphead.html&WT.z_nav=Naviga
tion [https://perma.cc/46EH-YDXD].
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into the taxpayer with respect to such element of the tax base. There would
be no need to provide information about a different taxpayer. If two taxes
are enforced in the same way, but in terms of legal terminology there is a
“third party” under one tax but no “third party” under the other tax, the “third
party” aspect of the first way of enforcing tax is clearly superfluous.
Just as importantly, consider the question why a government would
choose, in connection with any item of income, information reporting with
respect to the recipient rather than excise taxation with respect to the payor.
The answer is generally that there is some personal circumstance — be it
progressive tax rates that depend on the recipient’s total income (i.e., not just
income from particular payments or payors), credits and deductions,
personal expenses, and so on — to which the payors do not have easy
access.80 Therefore, such private information would have to come from the
recipients themselves. Insofar as such private information is not provided to
the payors, excises or final withholding are not feasible, and accurate tax
collection depends on compliance by the ultimate income recipients
themselves. But this is just to say that the adoption of information reporting
as opposed to withholding/excises is precisely premised upon the
incompleteness of information possessed by payors (third parties). It is not
a solution to the incompleteness of information held by the government.
This point has ample illustrations both historically and
comparatively. In the history of U.S. taxation, for instance, there were no
progressive tax rates for the withholding/excise tax mechanisms under the
1862 Revenue Act.81 Conversely, progressive income tax rates were
introduced under the 1913 Income Tax Act, which rendered the withholding
provisions of the Act infeasible, and information reporting replaced it.82 A
comparative study carried out by the U.S. Treasury Department showed that
the extent to which a country’s income tax system takes into account
individual taxpayer circumstances largely explains why some countries
adopt final withholding for individual income while others do not.83
In sum, information reporting becomes relevant only when the tax
law permits private information to be relevant. This undermines the pretense
that there is some necessary, pre-existing information asymmetry — for
example, between the recipients of wages, salaries, and dividends, on the one
hand, and the government, on the other — which information reporting
reduces or overcomes. Such asymmetry comes into place only when the
government has made the choice of giving information - private to these
80. See generally RETURN-FREE SYSTEMS, supra note 65.
81. This was perceived to generate horizontal inequities among different taxpayers
(because the income duty also imposed by the Act contained progressive tax rates through
exemptions). Desai, supra note 16, at 876-78.
82. Id. at 884-88.
83. See generally RETURN-FREE SYSTEMS, supra note 65.
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recipients - policy significance. Information asymmetries and information
reporting are two sides of the same coin.
B. The Puzzle of Payor Compliance
There is a different, more basic, reason why information reporting
offers an inadequate explanation of compliance even in the context of taxing
individual wage and financial income. An obvious question arises: what
accounts for compliance on the part of the “third parties” that perform
information reporting and/or withholding? What, for example, prevents
employers from regularly colluding with employees in under-reporting
wages, and bargaining with employees for the benefit of the tax savings from
such underreporting?84 Such collusion is widespread today in developing
countries.85 It is also prevalent in the informal sectors in developed
countries: in the U.S., for example, the level of compliance with the “nanny
tax” is perceived to be low and has remained so for many years.86 It is in fact
quite visible even in the formal sectors of developed countries: many
employers and employees push the envelope on what counts as non-taxable
fringe benefits, on the basis that the IRS is unlikely to conduct audits.87
Given that there are rarely other “third parties” monitoring the “third party”
required to perform information reporting, why does the latter comply with
tax law?
A typical answer given to this question is that employers can claim
deductions for wage payments, which lower the employer’s income tax
liability. The employee and the employer thus have adverse interests, or
opposing incentives, with respect to reporting wage payments: while the
employee stands to lose from employer reporting, the employer gains from

84. See, e.g., Gideon Yaniv, Collaborated Employee-Employer Tax Evasion, 47 PUB.
FIN. 312, 312 (1992) (“Under a tax withholding system, an employer and his employees may
find it mutually beneficial to strike a bargain under which the former withholds less than the
taxes due . . . while the latter accepts less than the free market wage rate.”).
85. For a recent study, see Todd J. Kumler et al., Enlisting Employees in Improving
Payroll-Tax Compliance: Evidence from Mexico (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 19385, 2013).
86. See Sue Shellenbarger, Family Secret: More Parents are Avoiding the Nanny Tax,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2008, http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122583716191498477
[https://perma.cc/MD37-HSTH] (explaining that the rise of the Internet has caused a lot of
parents to stop paying the nanny tax); Celeste Watkins-Hayes, The Immorality of Evading the
Nanny Tax, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 26, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive
/2014/03/the-immorality-of-evading-the-nanny-tax/359637 [https://perma.cc/J48W-H6GN]
(“Recent estimates suggest that fewer than 250,000 U.S. households report household
employee wages, even though occupations like child care . . . are growing . . .”).
87. JOSEPH BANKMAN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 426 (16th ed. 2012); Yaniv,
supra note 84, at 313.
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it. Information reporting is therefore “self-enforcing.”88 It is also often
assumed that this reasoning applies to other types of payments.89
While this answer may be plausible in certain contexts, it both lacks
empirical generality and is theoretically naïve. In terms of empirical validity,
the answer may seem to have appeal in the U.S., where personal income tax
rates have been relatively low90 and the nominal corporate income tax rate
high91 since the 1960s. Therefore, employers’ wage deductions may often
save more tax dollars than the tax liabilities of employees. However, even
in the U.S., there are many situations where payments of income taxable to
payees are not deductible or generate minimal benefits to payors: examples
include non-deductible payments such as dividends and personal
expenditures (e.g. childcare), and deductible payments made by payors
subject to low or zero effective tax rates (e.g., due to losses, accelerated
depreciation, or tax exemptions). Indeed, it is generally believed that the
effective tax rate of U.S. corporations is far lower than the nominal tax rate,92
and may well be lower than the individual income tax rate applicable to many
employees. And in many OECD countries, the effective tax rate applicable
to wage income (especially when payroll taxes or social security
contributions are considered) far exceeds the corporate income tax rate
applicable to employers. Therefore, the net potential tax saving from nonreporting of wage income is quite significant.
Generally, holding information reporting to be self-enforcing is
theoretically naïve because it assumes that the parties to the transactions
(both the party that must declare income and the party that claims expense

88. Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 15, at 1739, 1747, 1751 n.93;
Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 15, at 711, 729-30.
89. Payors are also subject to penalties for failing to withhold or report to the
government. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE PUB. 55B, DATA BOOK 21 (2016) (Rev. 3-2017)
(noting that “[t]he IRS audited 0.7% of all individual income tax returns filed in CY 2015,
and 1.1% of corporation income tax returns (excluding S corporation returns)”). However,
with low audit rates, the expected value of such penalties may be very low. While there are
far fewer employers than employees in any economy, the number of employers is generally
still too great for tax authorities realistically to maintain a high rate of audit coverage. Indeed,
the audit rate for parties required to perform information reporting is not known to be higher
than in other areas of tax administration. Therefore, a high probability of detection through
audits cannot be what explains payor compliance.
90. U.S. Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, 1862-2013 (Nominal and
Inflation-Adjusted Brackets), TAX FOUND. (Oct. 13, 2013), https://taxfoundation.org/usfederal-individual-income-tax-rates-history-1913-2013-nominal-and-inflation-adjustedbrackets/ [https://perma.cc/T68N-2YEX].
91. Historical Corporate Top Tax Rate and Bracket: 1909-2014, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Dec.
2, 2015) http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/taxfacts/content/pdf/corpo
rate_historical_bracket.pdf [https://perma.cc/LS5C-NENV].
92. See Yaniv, supra note 84, at 315 (citing a study showing that in 1982, the average
effective tax rate of U.S. corporations was 13.1% when the statutory tax rate was 46%).
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deductions) are subject to similar effective tax rates. But when this is the
case, the government precisely collects no net revenue from the transaction:
the inclusion by the payee is cancelled by the deduction by the payor.93 It is
when parties are not subject to the same tax rates that the government can
collect net revenue from a transaction, but then, putting aside transaction
costs and the failure to reach and maintain collusive bargains, the potential
will always exist for the parties to collude and lower the net payment to the
government. For instance, if an employer’s corporate income tax rate is
substantially higher than the personal income tax rate applicable to wage
recipients, an incentive arises for employers and employees to collude to
over-report wage payments.
This problem — the pervasive incentives for payor-payee collusion
— is relevant even if final withholding, excise taxation, or any other
alternative to information reporting is adopted. It is thus of fundamental
significance in theorizing about compliance, and is taken seriously by
theorists who rigorously model tax compliance.94
C. Lack of Causal Identification
The following fact is routinely touted as evidence for TPIR’s
effectiveness in securing compliance. In the U.S. and a number of other
countries, tax administrators study the “tax gap” by conducting audits
designed to precisely measure the compliance level of a representative
sample of the population.95 Many of these studies have revealed that the
taxpayer compliance rate is much higher for wages and passive financial
income than it is for self-employment income.96 Since wage and passive
financial income are usually subject to TPIR while self-employment income
is not, it is argued, higher compliance is produced by TPIR.97
93. In other words, the irony of “self-enforcing” mechanisms is that the government can
never expect to raise any net revenue where they operate.
94. See, e.g., KKS, supra note 3, at 219-24 (analyzing collusion as it pertains to
compliance); Yaniv, supra note 84 (highlighting the impact of collusion).
95. Kleven et al., supra note 11; Mark D. Phillips, Individual Income Tax Compliance
and Information Reporting: What Do the U.S. Data Show? 67 NATL TAX J. 531, 536 (2014).
96. Kleven, supra note 8, at 79-83; Kleven et al., supra note 11, at 653; Phillips, supra
note 95, at 532; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUB. NO. 3744 (REV.
6-2014), STRATEGIC PLAN FY2014-2017 34 (2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p3
744.pdf [https://perma.cc/64DR-DYUP]; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE., U.S. DEP’T OF
TREASURY, TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010 5 (Apr. 2016),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax%20gap%20estimates%20for%202008%20through%
202010.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SHF-AKN7].
97. See Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, 21 J. ECON.
PERSP. 25, 37 (2007) (“Line item by line item, there is a clear positive correlation between the
rate of compliance and the presence of enforcement mechanisms such as information reports
and employer withholding.”).
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Such inferences from correlation to causation are, however, highly
unreliable. Specifically, it is rarely possible to disentangle the use of TPIR
from two types of confounding factors, which may undermine both the
internal and external validity of the inferences. These two factors are (a) the
nature of the (individual) income and (b) the nature of the payor.
Consider the first. As suggested in Part II.A supra (and as will be
further elaborated in Part III infra), TPIR seems particularly tailored to wage
and passive investment income. Yet, governments can often secure
compliance with tax collection with respect to these types of income without
relying on TPIR. For example, most financial transactions create paper (or
digital) trails, and such documentation trails, as opposed to TPIR, may
induce compliance with respect to passive financial income. None of the
studies purportedly demonstrating the effectiveness of TPIR, however, try to
distinguish the effect of TPIR from the effect of paper trails. Yet the
distinction is important: a paper trail is useful only if the government decides
to audit taxpayers, while TPIR itself would affect the making of that
decision.
Similarly, as argued earlier, tax can be effectively collected from
wages and financial income through withholding or, equivalently
administratively, payor excise taxation. There has been no study to show
that TPIR is more effective than withholding or excise taxation (or, where
withholding and information reporting are simultaneously implemented, that
the latter is effective independently of the former). This implies that no
evidence has been produced that “but for” TPIR, the level of compliance
could not be as high as is actually observed.98
Consider next the nature of the payor. In one study analyzing Danish
taxpayer data, Henrik Kleven and co-authors found that after controlling for
both whether an item of income is subject to TPIR and whether it is likely to
be audited, the effect of firm size still has a significant impact on the rate of
tax evasion.99 They infer from this that “collusion between taxpayers and
third parties may be important in small firms,” even in Denmark.100 This
suggests that firm size may matter for compliance independently of the use
of TPIR. By contrast, there has been no study investigating the distinct effect
of TPIR while holding firm size constant.101

98. Contrast this with the claim made in Kleven, supra note 8, at 79, that it has been
shown “empirically that tax enforcement is successful if and only if third-party information
covers a large fraction of taxable income” (emphasis added).
99. Kleven et al., supra note 11, at 676.
100. Id. at 676 n.27.
101. This is no doubt partly due to the fact that the main studies testing the effectiveness
of TPIR are based on individual taxpayer returns, and therefore, can typically control only for
the characteristics of the individual taxpayers. See sources cited supra note 96.
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Purported evidence for TPIR’s effectiveness that is not based on
individual tax return data is even more problematic. For example, some
point to the fact that economies with larger formal employment sectors have
higher tax-to-GDP ratios.102 Yet, these are likely to be economies with
greater presence of large firms, which are responsible for paying for the bulk
of wages.103 The compliance of such firms, as opposed to TPIR per se, may
be the reason for the high level of observed compliance with respect to wage
income. The fact that much tax revenue is collected through taxes not
involving TPIR further weakens the credibility of claims about TPIR’s
relevance.104
If there is causation in this area, it is more plausible to regard it as
lying between the large tax base of wages and financial income in advanced
economies, on the one hand, and the collection of revenue from such income,
on the other. When a large wage and financial income tax base is absent,
information reporting could have little use. But once such conventions are
developed, other collection mechanisms, such as final withholding or payor
excise taxation, may be deployed instead of information reporting. The
differences among these different collection mechanisms do not map onto
differences in enforcement and are merely nominal. Therefore, the “third
party” aspect of information reporting cannot constitute genuine causal
mechanism.
III.

THE BOUNDARIES OF THIRD-PARTY REPORTING

Scholars who hold information reporting to be essential to modern
tax compliance also tend to express great optimism in information
reporting’s future.105 To them, the benefits of information reporting are
proven, and its cost can only go down.106 So far, I have questioned whether
information reporting’s benefits have really been proven. In this Part, I
suggest a new way of thinking about how the cost of TPIR determines its
limits, i.e., why we find third-party reporting in some places and not others.
Moreover, I discuss some strong evidence of the ineffectiveness of TPIR
beyond its traditional spheres.

102. See, e.g., Kleven, supra note 8, at 81-83 (pointing to such a fact).
103. Jensen, supra note 44.
104. See supra Part I.
105. See, e.g., Alm & Soled, supra note 21 (providing an example of scholars who believe
information reporting is beneficial). See also Pomeranz, supra note 9, at 2567 (“[M]echanis
ms that provide information to the government, such as online billing systems or electronic
receipts . . . may have high returns.”).
106. Id.
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A. Previous Attempts at Cost-Benefit Analyses of Information
reporting
Legal scholars have previously attempted to articulate a framework
for analyzing the costs and benefits of third-party reporting.107 Yet, the
predictive power of what they have suggested is limited. For example,
Leandra Lederman has described six conditions:108
a) The party furnishing the information report should be at arm’slength from, and should be unlikely to benefit from collusion with,
the taxpayer.
b) Only those who possess a bookkeeping infrastructure should be
required to information report.
c) Information reporting parties should be fewer in number than
taxpayers reported on, allowing the government to centralize the
sources of information.
d) “Information reporting is most effective when it provides all of the
information necessary for the government to match the third-party
report with corresponding amounts on the taxpayer’s return; partial
reporting reduces enforcement efficiency.”
e) There should be few ways for the taxpayer to cheaply avoid
information reporting.
f) Transactions that do not contribute substantially to the tax gap in the
absence of information reporting should not be prime targets for
information reporting.
It is not hard to see that the predictive power of these six factors is
weak. Consider the idea that parties furnishing the information report should
be unlikely to benefit from collusion.109 In reality, the potential for collusion
among employers and employees to evade taxes (and for similar collusion
among other arm’s-length parties) is ever present.110 Nonetheless, this has
not precluded employer information reporting from being adopted.
Similarly, it is true that those required to information report generally possess
a bookkeeping infrastructure and are fewer in number than taxpayers
reported on. But these two factors are equally present in contexts where
third-party reporting is generally not adopted. Supermarkets and department
stores possess bookkeeping infrastructures and are fewer in number than
individual shoppers. Yet governments do not require retail stores to report
the individual purchases made by shoppers (although stores may be asked to
collect sales taxes). Finally, the principles that there should be limited
107. See, e.g., Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 15. See also Bankman,
supra note 15.
108. Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 15, at 1739-41.
109. Id.
110. See discussion infra Part II.B (explaining payor compliance challenges).
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opportunities for cheap avoidance, and that TPIR’s costs should be
commensurate with its benefits, clearly apply to legal design in general, and
do not specifically explain the scope of third-party reporting.
Factor (d) on Professor Lederman’s list, however, does imply a way
of predicting the use of information reporting. When there is discrepancy
between gross payment and taxable income, information reporting by the
payor needs to be structured to reconcile such discrepancies to be useful. For
example, when brokers were only required to report proceeds from sales of
securities to the IRS, without reporting the tax basis of the securities in
respect of their owners, the information reported was only of limited
utility.111 The requirement commencing in 2011 for brokers to report on the
tax basis of securities thus illustrates a change from incomplete to more
complete reporting on capital gain and loss.112 Conversely, as we will see
through the extended discussion of recent credit card reporting in the U.S.
below,113 when discrepancies between gross payment and taxable income
cannot be reconciled, the utility of information reporting for the government
is sharply reduced.114
Other scholars have also noted the need for information reporting to
be complete to be effective.115 However, when is information reporting
likely to be incomplete? Little attention has been given to answering this
question. I will now suggest an answer: information reporting is likely to be
incomplete whenever the income-generating activity involves many market
transactions from which agency relationships and financial claims are
absent.

111. See Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 15, at 1743-44
(“Accordingly, this change will likely prove to be a valuable one.”).
112. See id. at 1743 (explaining that the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
enabled comprehensive reporting on securities sales).
113. See discussion infra Part III Section C.
114. See id. (discussing how information reporting may still serve purposes other than
transmitting information to the government).
115. See Bankman, supra note 15, at 513 (“One problem with this sort of scale-back is
that as the proportion of transactions subject to third-party reporting declines, the utility of
each item reported also declines.”); Carrillo et al., supra note 11, at 162 (“In addition, the
effect of third-party reporting can be limited when such reporting is incomplete and the tax
authority has limited ability to audit the unreported margins.”); Slemrod et al., supra note 11,
at 19 (“For information reporting to have a strong effect on tax compliance, it must target a
noncompliant group of taxpayers and it must subject a large share of their income to
information reporting.”).
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B. Agency Relationships, Financial Claims, and Non-Anonymity of
Transacting Parties
It appears that all instances of TPIR in the individual income
taxation context involve either: (i) a relationship of agency, (ii) a contractual
relationship, especially one establishing a financial claim, or (iii) a
combination of the two. For example, employment is an agency relationship.
Financial income typically arises from financial claims, though in modern
financial markets financial claims tend to be intermediated by layers of
agency relationships.116
Market transactions involving agency relationships and financial
clams are distinctive in the following respect: they require mutual knowledge
of the identities of the transacting parties.117 It is the intrinsic nature of an
agency relationship for the principal and agent to know who each other are.
Similarly, financial claims by definition persist over time; therefore, the
parties need the identities of their counterparties to locate them later on.
Thus, parties that have financial claims against one another generally do not
remain anonymous.118 By contrast, the sale and purchase of goods and
services generally transpire in such a way that parties need not know the
identities of their counterparties, or in any case do not retain information
about such identities. Transactions in goods and services require the keeping
of identities only insofar as they create claims over time (e.g., warranty for
defective products) or the relationship of agency.
The distinctiveness of agency relationships and financial
transactions in terms of the keeping of party identities has, to my knowledge,
seldom been noted.119 It is, however, related to the claims that law and
economics scholars have made about the contexts in which parties make
enforceable contracts. Polinsky and Shavell, for example, suggest that
contracts are first needed in “virtually any kind of financial arrangement.”120

116. For a recent discussion in the tax literature of such relationships, see Reid Thompson
& David Weisbach, Attributes of Ownership, 67 TAX L. REV. 249 (2014).
117. Government transfers such as low-income support or supplemental income for the
unemployed, which are often subject to information reporting and/or withholding, are also
inherently non-anonymous. Some agency relationships and financial claims may nonetheless
involve anonymity (e.g., the use of bearer instruments). So one may think of the presence of
agency relationships and financial claims as generally necessary but not sufficient conditions
for the keeping of mutual identities.
118. Where they do, they are connected through a chain of non-anonymous agency
relationships.
119. See Wei Cui, Destination-Based Cash-Flow Taxation: A Critical Appraisal, 67 U.
TORONTO LAW J. 301 (2017), Part VI, where I explore the implications of this phenomenon
for the structure of international taxation.
120. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, in THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed.
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For similar reasons, they suggest that parties make enforceable contracts to
arrange “the supply of customized or specialized goods and services, which
cannot be purchased on a spot market in a simultaneous exchange for
money.”121
The presence of agency relationships or financial claims predicts the
boundaries of information reporting remarkably well. In the U.S., most types
of information reporting are done by parties in agency relationships or
subject to financial claims. Reporting by employers and brokers are
examples of the former; reporting by payors of interest, dividends, social
security payments, and by partnerships and S-corporations are examples of
the latter. Recently introduced reporting by payment settlement entities,
such as Visa, and third-party settlement entities, such as eBay,122 can be
viewed as based on both agency and financial relationships. The major
deviation from reporting by principals, agents, and parties subject to
financial claims is reporting by businesses of payments to service providers
of annual amounts in excess of $600 (i.e., the issuance of 1099-MISC
forms).123 Even here, the limitation of information reporting to recipients of
services (as opposed to goods) requires rationalization, which is easily
suggested by the fact that most such services involve either an agency
relationship or at least something very close.
The connection between agency and financial transactions, on the
one hand, and information reporting, on the other, is straightforward. In such
transactions, market participants routinely record payments made to
identified parties. All the government has to do in imposing reporting
requirements is to harness such information. By contrast, in other
transactions where parties do not normally keep track of mutual identities,
obtaining information about such identities and associating transactions with
them introduces costs not originally present in market activities. It is this
kind of cost that policymakers may not find justifiable to impose, especially
when the information gathered would offer only an incomplete picture of the
tax base.
A good illustration of this point is a third-party reporting device that
has received frequent favorable comments from academics in recent years,
2005), at 14. This is presumably because such arrangements inherently require performance
in the future.
121. Id. Indeed, the relationship of contract itself perhaps always implies non-anonymity
between the contracting parties. But non-anonymity may extend to agency relationships
without contract. And while there may be many instances of non-agency, non-financial
contracts, the absence of payment under such contracts (until the time of performance) may
render them less relevant for income tax purposes. Hence the claim here that information
reporting always involves agency relationships and financial transactions can be seen as an
adaptation of Polinsky and Shavell’s general claim to the tax context.
122. See infra Part III Section C.
123. Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-1.
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but is perceived to deliver only very mixed results in the real world: inducing
consumers to report on merchants through the use of lotteries.124 Generally,
we do not expect merchants to keep information about consumers, for
reasons just noted. Suppose, however, that a lottery is established, so that
consumers who report enough of their receipts from purchases may win a
prize. Such a system was implemented in Sao Paolo, Brazil.125 To facilitate
the lottery, merchants collected social security numbers from consumers, and
such information was later used for processing lottery claims.126 It is clear
here that it was the lottery — a type of financial transaction127 — that created
the need of merchants to collect consumer information. By contrast, if we
ask how often merchants (i.e., sellers of ordinary goods and services) need
social security numbers from their customers, the answer is almost never.128
Within the income tax context, the logic of agency relationships and
financial claims helps to explain the scope of information reporting in two
ways. First, if income can be computed only after taking deductions into
account, and if either income, deductions, or both arise from activities
involving multiple market transactions, information reporting by payors is
likely to require identity-keeping by market participants who would
otherwise not keep mutual identities. The additional social cost of gathering

124. For favorable academic comments on consumer lotteries in information reporting,
see, e.g., Bankman, supra note 15, at 510-11 (noting that lotteries are cheap compliance
measures); Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 15, at 1753 (“A creative
alternative used in some countries is to have consumers’ receipts double as lottery tickets.”);
Slemrod, supra note 11, at 39-40 (explaining how lotteries incentivize consumers to report
firm tax evasion); and Joana Naritomi, Consumers as Tax Auditors 35 (London Sch. of Econ.
and Political Sci., Working Paper, 2016) (“In particular, the paper provides supporting
evidence that consumers respond to lottery incentives to ask for receipts, which is the most
common policy reward used by governments to mobilize consumers against tax evasion.”).
For critical discussion of real-world experience, see, e.g., IMF, supra note 2, at 29-30
(highlighting the limits of lottery schemes); Jonas Fooken et al., Improving VAT
Compliance—Random Rewards for Tax Compliance 3 (Eur. Comm’n Taxation Papers,
Working Paper No. 51-2014, 2014) (“While there is growing interest in the use of tax lotteries
throughout Europe, the understanding of best practises [sic] and success factors is still
limited.”).
125. Naritomi, supra note 124, at 11.
126. Id. at 11-15.
127. Many consumer lotteries aimed at improving tax collection involve instantaneous
lotteries, and thus, simply give incentives to consumers to help create paper trails (e.g., sales
receipts) as opposed to actually involving them in information reporting. See Fooken, supra
note 124 (documenting insights from a workshop that sought to bring together countries with
experience and those interested in running tax lotteries).
128. Consumers may voluntarily keep information about merchants (for purposes of
returns, warranties, etc.), but requiring information reporting by consumers on merchants
would be something different. It would also violate the conditions of centralization and bookkeeping infrastructure that Lederman identified. Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps,
supra note 15.
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and transmitting transactional information would be hard to justify,
especially if even the aggregate of the transactions may not correctly reflect
income (given the difference between cash and accrual accounting, between
ordinary and capital expenditures, and so on).
Second, agency relationships and relationships of financial claims
explain the imposition of information reporting requirements even where the
transactional amounts do not closely track the tax base, i.e., despite the likely
ineffectiveness of information reporting. U.S. broker information reporting
of gross receipts from the disposition of securities before the recent
introduction of basis reporting is an example of this. The filing of forms
1099-MISC and 1099-K is another. Here, the adoption of information
reporting can be rationalized at least by its relatively low cost — the
government is merely harnessing information that market participants
already possess.
In summary, TPIR is likely to be adopted only where the incremental
cost of gathering transaction information (including identities of transacting
parties) is small relative to business practices in the absence of tax, and
especially if the additional cost of transmitting such information is matched
by a distinct benefit for the government in identifying the tax base. Modern
economic conditions and income tax law have molded a large portion of the
individual income tax base to fit these conditions, but much of the rest of the
tax base of “modern taxes” has never come close to meeting these conditions.
I believe this account constitutes a more parsimonious description of patterns
in the actual use of information reporting than previous accounts. Identifying
such a systematic pattern should make the effective scope of information
reporting less of an article of faith.
C. Recent Evidence: Does Credit Card Reporting Increase
Compliance?
The theory just advanced is consistent with the very mixed evidence
for the effectiveness of TPIR when implemented beyond the realm of wage
and financial income. A uniquely authoritative study on this topic was
carried out recently by economists at the IRS and the University of
Michigan.129 Slemrod et al. examined how self-employed individual
taxpayers (Schedule C filers) in the U.S. responded to information reporting
newly introduced in 2011. Under the new reporting regime, electronic
payments received by businesses (e.g., credit card payments and payments
by online commerce platforms such as eBay) are reported by the firms
processing these payments.130 This enabled the researchers to carry out a
129. Slemrod et al., supra note 11.
130. See Money Crashers, What Online Resellers Need to Know About the 1099-K, U.S.
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large-scale study: Slemrod et al. matched 2.5 million new information
returns (1099-Ks) filed in 2012 to the tax returns of over a million Schedule
C filers.131
At first glance, the IRS’ capacity to analyze such a large quantity of
information may bolster one’s confidence that TPIR would help detect and
deter non-compliance. However, Slemrod et al.’s study suggests three
sobering conclusions. First, the new information reporting regime has not
detectably increased taxpayer compliance. Second, the data that the IRS
possesses about individuals’ business income even under the post-2011
regime is very incomplete and noisy. And third, although careful
econometric analyses establish instances of taxpayers’ strategic behavior in
response to information reporting, the nature of the strategic behaviors
detected is difficult to interpret; the data analysis thus does not yield clear
audit implications.
1. 1099-K reporting: incompleteness and minimal deterrence effect
Slemrod et al. first found that at least in the first two years (201112), the introduction of Form 1099-K had no impact on the aggregate net
income reported by Schedule C filers.132 There was also no detectable
additional deterrence effect relative to pre-existing information reporting.133
They concluded that the overall initial deterrence effect of the new form of
reporting was minimal.134 Rather, the main impact of the introduction of
Form 1099-K discovered by their study was on a small group of taxpayers
representing less than ten percent of their sample; the characters and
behavior of this group are further discussed below.135 But before turning to
such specific findings, it is important to reflect on Slemrod et al.’s finding of
NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Apr. 10, 2012, 9:00 AM), https://money.usnews.com/money/blogs
/my-money/2012/04/10/what-online-resellers-need-to-know-about-the-1099-k
[https://perma.cc/687Z-4CZR]; Kelly Phillips Erb, Credit Cards, The IRS, Form 1099-K And
The $19,399 Reporting Hole, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2014, 11:13 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/kellyphillipserb/2014/08/29/credit-cards-the-irs-form-1099-k-and-the-19399-reportinghole/#4337ff851ae8 [https://perma.cc/2JZL-9CQQ] (explaining the intricacies of new
reporting requirements that became effective in 2012).
131. Slemrod et al., supra note 11, at 7. These information returns represented $160
billion (three percent) of the total $5.3 trillion of receipts reported to the IRS on all 10.3
million 1099-Ks through the new information reporting program.
132. Id. at 11.
133. Id. at 7-10. The revenue growth for taxpayers who became subject to information
reporting for the first time under 1099-K followed similar trends, on average, to other groups
of taxpayers already subject to prior information reporting (e.g. using 1099-MISC). The
trends are also similar for the group of taxpayers not subject to either type of reporting. Id. at
12.
134. Id. at 12.
135. See Part III.C.2 infra.
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minimal deterrence on the overall population. This seems disappointing,
especially to those who had advocated for the adoption of credit card
reporting. Whatever social costs were incurred in the preparation and
issuance of 1099-K forms, it appears that no new revenue was raised.136
This result can be explained in a number of ways. For instance, the
most common type of tax evasion is done through cash transactions
anyway.137 But perhaps equally importantly, even if one disregards taxmotivated uses of cash, one might be concerned that the scope of credit card
reporting is insufficiently broad. Slemrod et al.’s data suggests that for those
taxpayers subject to 1099-K reporting, more than 85% reported receipts that
were significantly greater than the amounts shown on the 1099-Ks they
received — indeed, most taxpayers reported far more — and only fewer than
five percent reported significantly less.138 Under Slemrod et al.’s theoretical
assumptions, in the absence of information reporting, taxpayers who are
predisposed to cheat will under-report business receipts. When there is
information reporting, these taxpayers may believe that failing to declare at
least the amounts of receipts reported on Form 1099-Ks substantially and
discontinuously increases the risk of audit. Therefore, such taxpayers would
report amounts on their Schedule C’s that are at least equal to amounts
reported on 1099-Ks. In other words, information reporting creates a floor
for reported receipts. When this idea is applied to the real world, however,
it appears that this floor was binding only for about ten percent of the
Schedule C filer population.139
This is consistent with the idea that for most businesses, a substantial
gap may exist between the volume of all market transactions and the volume
of transactions for which the parties maintain mutual identities. Indeed, this
idea is the basis for the main analytical strategy of Slemrod et al.’s study.
They assume that amounts reported on Form 1099-Ks will accurately
represent the total business receipts only for a very small segment of
taxpayers, e.g., online sellers who derive most of their receipts from the likes
of eBay, etc.140 Based on this assumption, they hypothesize that among those
taxpayers whose reported receipts on Schedule C closely match amounts
reported on Form 1099-Ks, a substantial portion will be taxpayers with “a
high propensity to under-report receipts prior to the introduction of
136. Slemrod et al., supra note 11, at 7-10.
137. Id. at 1-2.
138. Id. at 8 (Figure 2); correspondence with Joel Slemrod and Daniel Reck.
“Significantly” greater or less here means amounts either five percent greater or five percent
less than the amounts reported on the relevant 1099-Ks.
139. Id. at 10.
140. Id. at 2 (“Bunching may occur because firms believe that reporting receipts above
the 1099-K amount avoids triggering an audit by contradicting third-party information, or
because all or virtually all of a firm’s receipts are subjected to credit-card information
reporting (as may be the case with exclusively online businesses).”).
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information reporting . . . .”141 In other words, rather than seeing amounts
reported on Form 1099-Ks as setting a relevant benchmark for truthful
reporting, close matching between Schedule C and 1099-K receipts should
be seen as a potential sign of cheating.
This methodology stands the traditional conception of the benefits
of information reporting (e.g., in connection with wage and passive financial
income) on its head. Under the traditional paradigm, third-party payors
provide near-complete information about taxable income to the government,
such that taxpayers are “unable to cheat” on such income.142 For credit card
reporting, however, third-party information may be so incomplete in respect
of both taxable receipts and deductible expenses that two consequences
inevitably follow. First, credit card reporting may leave plenty of room for
the under-statement of taxable receipts for taxpayers whose receipts far
exceed the amounts subject to 1099-K reporting. Second, even if credit card
reporting forces some taxpayers to report more taxable receipts than they
would have reported otherwise, they are not thereby “disabled” from
cheating, because they can still fudge numbers on the deductions side. This
second consequence is illustrated by Slemrod et al.’s finding of taxpayer
strategic behavior.
2. Strategic behavior in response to information reporting
Slemrod et al. postulate that credit card reporting would force some
taxpayers to report more taxable receipts than they would otherwise.143 But
two other types of related behavior are also likely. First, these taxpayers may
report amounts on their Schedule C’s not much more than, and possibly
exactly equal to, amounts reported on 1099-Ks. Second, they may increase
reported expenses to offset increased reported receipts, because it is more
difficult to verify expenses than to verify receipts. When information
reporting is incomplete, third-party-reported amounts may set a useful floor
for reported receipts, but they do not provide a useful ceiling for reported
expenses. Overall, then, Slemrod et al. imply that if one observes taxpayers
who (i) file tax returns only when subject to information reporting, (ii) whose
self-declared receipts largely match third-party reported receipts, and/or (iii)
whose expenses closely match receipts, such patterns are potentially
indicative of a propensity towards tax evasion.
Motivated by such reasoning, Slemrod et al. focused on the 9-10%
of their taxpayer sample that reported gross receipts within five percent of
the gross amount on the 1099-K’s issued to them. This is the group of

141. Id. at 2.
142. Kleven et al., supra note 11, at 651-52.
143. Slemrod et al., supra note 11, at 4.

CUI FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

9/27/2018 3:26 PM

2017] INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN TAX COLLECTION

125

taxpayers that “bunched” around the point where the ratio of (i) the receipts
reported on 1099-K forms issued to the taxpayer (denoted “K”) to (ii) gross
receipts reported on a taxpayer’s Schedule C (denoted “R”) is 1.144 Slemrod
et al. observe that taxpayers with K/R close to 1 report unusually large
increases in receipts from 2010 to 2011, which cannot be explained by the
trend of growth of taxpayers that happen to have a high share of true receipts
subject to information reporting. Instead, it is likely that many taxpayers
with K/R close to 1 reported more receipts after becoming subject to
additional third-party reporting.
Slemrod et al. find several other types of evidence of taxpayer
strategic behavior. First, taxpayers with K/R close to 1 in 2011 were
substantially less likely to have filed a Schedule C in prior years.145 Second,
taxpayers bunching around K/R=1 also reported large increases in expenses,
which to a great extent offset the increases in reported receipts by this group,
resulting in little change in net income reported.146 Third, taxpayers
bunching at where K/R=1 and new Schedule C filers who also receive 1099Ks are disproportionately likely to also bunch around the point where the
ratio of reported expense to receipt is 1.147 Fourth and finally, the authors
examine the composition of expenses to see precisely where taxpayers
increased expense reporting to offset increased receipts reporting, and find
increases occurred primarily in the “Other Expenses” line item. 148 In other
words, the new reported expenses seem opaque in their nature.
It seems likely, therefore, that some of the “bunching” taxpayers are
cheating. The group of taxpayers showing the foregoing “suspect” patterns
amounts to about one percent of the total population of taxpayers that the
authors studied.149 This suggests a potential benefit of TPIR for improving
the IRS’ audit strategies, despite the overall finding that U.S. credit card
reporting has not yet improved taxpayer compliance.150 If one thinks of the
IRS’s task of enforcing the law on Schedule C filers as searching for the
proverbial needle in the haystack, the new regime, it might be suggested, has
144. “Bunching” means an abnormal concentration of taxpayers at a point relative to the
overall distribution of taxpayers along a given dimension. However, not all taxpayers that
bunch around K/R=1 deserve suspicion. Some taxpayers may simply have a high share of
true receipts subjected to information reporting. If they report truthfully, their reported
receipts should largely match third-party reported receipts. Slemrod et al. confirm the
presence of such taxpayers. Slemrod et al., supra note 11, at 15.
145. This is the “extensive margin” response to 1099-K. The authors conservatively
estimate that Form 1099-K caused more than 20% of taxpayers in this particular group to start
filing Schedule C’s. Id. at 12.
146. Id. at 10-18.
147. Id. at 10.
148. Id. at 17.
149. Correspondence with Joel Slemrod and Daniel Reck.
150. Slemrod et al., supra note 11, at 15-17.

CUI FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

126

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

9/27/2018 3:26 PM

[Vol. 20.1

the potential of both reducing the size of the haystack and also increasing the
size of the needle. It reduces the size of the haystack by getting the IRS to
focus on the “bunchers”: 1099-K reporting gives the IRS a specific target
group to direct its limited enforcement resources. It also enlarges the size of
the needle by revealing taxpayers’ strategic behavior, such as new Schedule
C filing, increased claims of expenses, and matching claims of increased
expenses and receipts. Information reporting, in other words, may generate
footprints for the IRS to follow.151
However, this optimistic view faces at least two objections. First,
unlike taxpayers who under-declare wage income compared to amounts
reported on their W-2s, many “bunchers” displaying “suspect” revenue and
expense patterns may not be cheating. There are other, benign reasons why
taxpayers may have increased receipt reporting (including by filing Schedule
C for the first time) in response to information reporting, while
simultaneously increasing reported expenses.152 Therefore audits of this
taxpayer population will need to pick out the “needles” from the irrelevant,
“needle-like” items.153 Second, Slemrod et al. find that the “bunching”
taxpayers tend to be significantly smaller than the typical 1099-K
recipients.154 The revenue potential for devoting audit resources to this group
is thus limited, and may compare unfavorably with the option of auditing
larger taxpayers. In other words, focusing on “bunchers” does not so much
reduce the size of the haystack as to direct the IRS to an arbitrarilydetermined corner of it. Therefore, it is not clear that credit card information

151. I am grateful to George Yin for discussions of this point.
152. First, prior to information reporting, some taxpayers may have skipped reporting the
portion of their total receipts that corresponded to business expenses. The prior failure to
report thus represents a form of what one might call “self-help tax code simplification.”
Second, many payments reported by credit card companies may not represent true business
receipts because of fees, taxes, and merchandise returns. Some taxpayers may have tried to
reconcile such discrepancies between amounts on information returns and true receipts by
reporting fees, taxes, and merchandise returns as “other expenses.” Third, the tax law may
impose limitations on business deductions so as to “quarantine” them to particular types of
income. Greater income earned in such quarantined activities would automatically (and
legitimately) increase deductible expenses. Slemrod et al. offer persuasive evidence that this
third reason does not explain the increase in expense reporting by the “bunching” taxpayers
they study. Slemrod et al., supra note 11, at 15 n.32. However, the extent to which the two
explanations given in the text underlie the increased expense reporting that they identify is
unknown. Because Slemrod et al.’s formal model does not predict the complete offset of
increased reported receipts by expenses even for strategic taxpayers, these explanations
remain relevant.
153. Moreover, if the IRS is determined to search in this corner of the haystack, then tax
cheats may avoid coming into it: the only taxpayers remaining would be the ones who are
innocent. This means that the IRS may not be able to commit to auditing this portion of the
taxpayer population.
154. Id. at 11.
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reporting will lead to superior audit strategies. Its potential at generating
deterrence is similarly unclear.
The foregoing critique is not meant to imply that the adoption of
1099-K reporting in the U.S. cannot have beneficial effects for U.S. tax
administration. But it does suggest a general conclusion about the limitations
of the TPIR’s utility, given its limited implementability. This limitation has
two aspects. Suppose that, for the reasons given in Part III.B, TPIR
requirements may be implementable only for a fraction of market
transactions. Suppose that this fraction is β. Then, first, if for many
taxpayers, the proportion of transactions they are disposed to report (α)
without TPIR is a higher proportion (i.e., α > β), then TPIR will have no
effect on the compliance behavior of these taxpayers.155 This is so, even if α
may be significantly less than 1. Second, when the coverage of TPIR is
incrementally raised, some taxpayers may be forced to increase reporting
their taxable receipts, while engaging in related strategic behavior. It is not
clear, however, that the IRS should audit such taxpayers, because audit
selection may be based not on how low α is, but on how likely it is that an
audit will result in significant adjustments. This depends not only on α but
also the size of the taxpayer.156
IV.

FIRMS AS “FISCAL INTERMEDIARIES”: AN INADEQUATE
CONCEPTION

Previous scholars postulate that third-party reporting is an essential
tax collection device that explains modern tax compliance and the capacity
of developed countries to raise high levels of revenue.157 By contrast, I have
portrayed third-party reporting as a derivative institution, incapable of
explaining tax compliance by business firms and frequently substituted by
other administrative devices in the history of modern taxation. Similarly,
whereas many scholars view the scope of TPIR as affording indefinite
expansion in the future,158 I argue that TPIR is characterized by definite
limits. Nonetheless, I believe one fact that previous scholars have identified
155. Thus 1099-K reporting may have no effect on the 85% of Schedule C filers for whom
the K/R ratio is much smaller than 1. See supra notes 116 and 119 and accompanying text.
For another example, sole proprietors in the U.S. on average may report only 50% of their
business income. See I.R.S., TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010, supra note 96.
But the coverage of TPIR (β) may well be below this percentage for many taxpayers.
156. Suppose that taxpayers have total receipts of Ri but only report a portion αi. Tax
agencies may be mainly interested in those with the largest Ri*(1-αi), not the ones with the
largest (1-αi).
157. See, e.g., KKS, supra note 3; Kleven, supra note 8; Pomeranz, supra note 9
(emphasizing the importance of third party reporting in tax collection).
158. See, e.g., Alm & Soled, supra note 21; Carrillo et al., supra note 11 (touting the
boundless benefits of TPIR).
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may still hold the key to understanding modern tax collection: namely, the
centrality of business firms to the administration of modern taxes, be it the
withholding of individual income and payroll, or retail sales taxes, or the
payment of the corporate income tax, the VAT, and other business taxes.159
The main question, I would argue, is how to conceptualize the causal
connection between firms and tax compliance.
The prevailing view of the role of firms in tax compliance is that
they act as “fiscal intermediaries”: they collect and remit taxes, as well as
provide information about other taxpayers, to the government. 160 Firms
generate tax-related information to the government in two ways. First, by
providing information directly to the government about the taxable income
and taxable transactions of employers, investors, and customers, they
preclude the possibility of not reporting such income or transactions by the
latter taxpayers. Second, firms maintain accounting and transaction records,
which represent information that is not automatically transmitted to the
government but which the government may use in conducting audits.161
Through both mechanisms, firms act as depositories of accurate taxpayer
information which the government can access. This substantially increases
the probability of detection of non-compliant behavior, sometimes to close
to 100%. It therefore dramatically improves the deterrence effect of
penalties on non-compliance.
This conception of firms as passive depositories as well as
mechanical intermediaries of transactional information is, to my knowledge,
unusual in legal and social scientific scholarship outside the study of
taxation. It is often explicitly tied to the classic deterrence theory of tax
compliance, pioneered by Allingham and Sandmo.162 Under the Allingham
and Sandmo model, a taxpayer decides whether to engage in tax evasion by
weighing the expected benefits of evasion against the expected cost of being
159. See supra Part I.
160. See, e.g., Richard Bird, Why Tax Corporations? 10 (Dep’t of Fin. Can., Technical
Committee on Business Tax’n Working Papers No. 1996-02, 1996), https://www.ecn.ulaval
.ca/~sgor/cit/bird_FinanceCanadaWP_1996/whytaxcorps.pdf [https://perma.cc/EZG8-3YA
H ] (“The key to effective taxation is information, and the key to information in the modern
economy is the corporation.”); KKS, supra note 3 (describing firms as fiscal intermediaries);
Kopczuk & Slemrod, supra note 39, at 130 (explaining that firms remit the majority of tax
revenues to the government and are “often required to file information reports that can
facilitate monitoring of tax liabilities”).
161. See, e.g., Gordon & Li, supra note 45, at 856 n.13 (“[G]overnments . . . rely on
accounting reports . . . to double-check . . . reports by firms on individual earnings . . . .”);
KKS, supra note 3, at 220 (“[S]uch [accounting and transaction] records are widely used
within the firm . . . .”); Pomeranz, supra note 9, at 2543 (describing how a firm’s book of
purchases leads to a third-party paper trail and explaining that although Chilean firms need
not report that information to the tax authority, it can be accessed through an audit).
162. Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical
Analysis, 1 J. PUBLIC ECON. 323 (1972).
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caught and penalized.163 Taxpayers comply when the expected disutility of
evasion, which depends on the probability of detection and the magnitude of
penalties, outweighs its expected utility.164 It has been widely observed that
by itself, this simple model of the choice about whether to evade taxes seems
unable to explain the high level of tax compliance observed at least in
developed countries: the actual levels of penalties, audits, and evasion
detected during audits in real life are all far too low to lead a rational
individual considering only these factors to decide against tax evasion.165
Nonetheless, scholars have suggested that the Allingham and Sandmo model
can be salvaged if one considers the role of business firms.166 When firms
both automatically provide information to the government and maintain
information relevant to audits, then the probability of detection of tax evasion
(conditional upon an audit being carried out) is increased.167 Moreover,
when there are fewer firms than individual taxpayers, the audit rate for firms
is higher than for individuals, which also increases the probability of
detection.168
Yet as our earlier discussion anticipated,169 this effort to reconcile
the Allingham and Sandmo model with the observed high levels of tax
compliance in the real world merely begs a further question: why do
decision-makers in firms — owners, managers, and employers — choose not
to evade tax? Why do they provide accurate information about other
163. Id. at 324-26.
164. Id.
165. See James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 818, 855 (1998) (“The
most significant discrepancy that has been documented between the standard economic model
of compliance and real-world compliance behavior is that the theoretical model greatly overpredicts noncompliance.”); Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and
Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO STATE L.J. 1453, 1457 (2003) (“[I]t is often stated
in the tax compliance literature that deterrence does not explain voluntary compliance levels
in the United States or elsewhere.”); Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance,
Evasion and Administration, in 3 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1423, 1431 (A.J.
Auerbach & M. Feldstein eds., 2002) (“[B]ased on the degree of risk aversion exhibited in
other situations people should be evading [taxes] a lot more than they apparently do.”). For
information on actual rates of audit, see INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICES, PUB. 55B, DATA BOOK
(2015) (Rev. 3-2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/15databk.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2KGB5DK] (providing information on rates of audit).
166. See KKS, supra note 3, at 241 (claiming that “third-party information reporting by
employers can sustain tax enforcement in spite of low fines and low audit rates[,]” and that
modeling information reporting in the firm context “overcomes the main shortcoming of the
standard Allingham-Sandmo model of tax evasion”); Kopczuk & Slemrod, supra note 39, at
133-34 (advocating “putting firms into optimal tax theory” because “firms . . . give rise to
relatively easy-to-monitor transactions and can minimize the number of private agents
authorities must deal with”).
167. Pomeranz, supra note 9, at 2540, 2545.
168. Kopczuk & Slemrod, supra note 35, at 134; Pomeranz, supra note 9, at 2542.
169. See supra Part II.A.
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taxpayers to the government? In most countries, the population of firms is
still large relative to the number of tax auditors, which means that the general
probability of detection of tax evasion by firms would still be very low. Is
there any device that renders firms intent on evasion “unable to cheat”? If
not, then the Allingham and Sandmo model still cannot be reconciled with
the levels of (firm) tax compliance observed in the world. Something else
must explain observed firm compliance.
One of the latest attempts to solve this puzzle is found in the KKS
study mentioned in Part I.170 KKS analyze a firm’s “decision” not to evade
tax as the feasibility for employers and employees to maintain an equilibrium
of collusion: if everyone in the firm can agree to and honor a bargain to cheat
on the taxes that the firm is required to remit, and to divide up the firms’
consequent cash savings, then the firm will evade taxes.171 They argue that
such equilibrium would be difficult to maintain under two types of
circumstances. First, individual disgruntled (or morally conscientious)
employees create a small probability that the collusion would be reported
and detected, and such probabilities would become sufficiently large when
the firm is sufficiently large.172 Second, the government can offer monetary
awards for whistleblowing to employees who otherwise would have been
willing to collude in the firm’s tax evasion.173 KKS in effect offer an analog
of the Allingham and Sandmo model for firms: the probability of detection
of evasive behavior crucially depends not on audits conducted by the
government, but on disgruntled employees or whistleblowers.
Unfortunately, this account of firms’ tax compliance decisions is just
as problematic as the traditional account of individual tax compliance
decisions. To begin, although whistleblower programs operated by tax and
other regulatory agencies have attracted attention in recent years, their role
in the history of tax and other areas of regulatory enforcement has been
minimal.174
Even today, whistleblower programs are viewed as
170. KKS, supra note 3. Another strand of the recent literature claims that firms do not
cheat because they are subject to information reporting by other firms, for example through
mechanisms under the VAT. See Carrillo et al., supra note 11, at 14; Pomeranz, supra note
9, at 2541 (arguing that firms report honestly due to information reporting requirements). I
have argued elsewhere that this strand of analysis involves mischaracterizations of and
implausible claims about the VAT. Wei Cui, Information Reporting and State Capacity,
paper presented at Part III of the 109th Annual Conference of the National Tax Association
(Nov. 10, 2016).
171. KKS, supra note 3, at 220.
172. Id. KKS does not provide any simulation to specify how many employees a firm
needs to have for evasion to be infeasible.
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Whistle-Blowing Insiders: ‘Game Changer’ for the
S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/07/business/dealbo
ok/whistle-blowing-insiders-game-changer-for-the-sec.html [https://perma.cc/J476-QED9]
(discussing a whistleblower program that was only recently adopted by the U.S. Securities

CUI FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

9/27/2018 3:26 PM

2017] INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN TAX COLLECTION

131

complements to regulatory agencies’ audit operations, allowing the
government to discover violations that would otherwise be difficult to
uncover,175 rather than as a mechanism imposing more systematic constraints
on taxpayers and other regulated subjects than audits themselves. It is simply
implausible to claim that whistleblower programs undergird the
transformation of public finance in the twentieth century witnessed in most
advanced economies.176 Moreover, while it is commonly observed that
larger firms tend to be more compliant with tax law and other legal
requirements, firm size in itself does not preclude fraudulent activity: recent
reports of large-scale frauds at Volkswagen and Wells Fargo offer vivid
reminders of this fact.177
In the (vast) legal and social scientific literature on tax
compliance,178 the inadequacy of the Allingham and Sandmo model has led
to a variety of theories about why individuals may be motivated to follow
the tax law.179 It is not the intention of this Article to review or even
summarize this variety of theories.180 I will instead note two features of the
and Exchange Commission); Laura Saunders, How to Turn In Your Neighbor to the IRS,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 3, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240531119033527045
76540840395329676 [https://perma.cc/85SR-HH5F] (quoting tax historian Joseph Thorndike
as reporting that payments to whistleblowers in the history of U.S. taxation “tended to be
small and rare because IRS officials were uncomfortable with ‘bounty hunting’”); Jordan A.
Thomas, Policing the Banks Is an Inside Job, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.nyti
mes.com/2016/10/01/opinion/policing-the-banks-is-an-inside-job.html
[https://perma.cc/8W79-LAAW] (advocating the adoption of a whistleblower program by
banking regulators).
175. See Henning, supra note 174 (noting, for example, that rewards for whistleblowers
are increased in areas of agency priority).
176. See supra Part I, Figure 2.
177. Adam Davidson, How Regulation Failed with Wells Fargo, THE NEW YORKER (Sept.
12, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/the-record-fine-against-wellsfargo-points-to-the-failure-of-regulation [https://perma.cc/R2VT-PEM2]; Russell Hotten,
Volkswagen: The scandal explained, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/
business-34324772 [https://perma.cc/2RAG-TDE4].
178. See Slemrod, supra note 11 for a review of recent scholarship. For earlier reviews,
see Andreoni et al., supra note 165; Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Tax Compliance as the
Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation,
29 LAW & POL’Y 102, 102 (2007) (exploring tax compliance in terms of a psychological tax
contract between citizens and the government); Slemrod & Yitzhaki, supra note 165.
179. The inadequacy of the deterrence theory of compliance in other areas of publiclyenforced law has led to similar explorations in alternative theories. See, e.g., Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms in Corporate
Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 60 (2003) (“In the academic literature
and policy debates, an alternative ‘cooperation model’ has been proposed, in large part
as a reaction to the adversarial enforcement methods suggested by
the deterrence model.”).
180. A relatively recent summary and set of references can be found in Alex Raskolnikov,
Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
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literature. First, theories that are presented as major alternatives to the
Allingham and Sandmo model tend to postulate psychological features of
individuals that are not captured by that model.181 However, to my
knowledge, none has attempted to “put firms into [the theory]” in the way
that scholars (such as KKS) aiming to salvage or expand the Allingham and
Sandmo model have done. In other words, only scholars interested in
reformulating the Allingham and Sandmo model have given significance to
the regular empirical association between the presence of business firms and
higher levels of tax compliance. Yet as Part I discussed, such empirical
regularity seems unmistakable and forms part of the conventional wisdom of
what makes tax administration effective. Of course, conventional wisdoms
may be mistaken (as I have argued is the case for the belief about the
importance of TPIR), but they may also be robust and offer important
theoretical insights.
Second, many scholars have formulated theories and empirically
tested hypotheses about tax compliance as though tax compliance is a selfcontained social problem.182 Although some legal scholars have argued that
people comply with the tax law simply because there is a social norm of
complying with the law, this approach is not generally followed.183 Instead,
scholars tend to study individual preferences and attitudes specifically
towards tax compliance, as if paying tax has become a deep-rooted part of
our psyche.184 Yet modern taxation directly affecting the obligations of mass
689, 696-701 (2009). Another recent literature review can be found in Erzo F.P. Luttmer &
Monica Singhal, Tax Morale, 28 J. ECON. PERSP.. 149 (2014).
181. See, e.g., FRANK A. COWELL, CHEATING THE GOVERNMENT: THE ECONOMICS OF
EVASION 102–03 (1990) (finding that taxpayers’ perceptions of other taxpayers in the same
social grouping affect taxpaying attitudes and behaviors); Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J.
Bursik, Jr., Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence
Model, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 837, 847 (1990) (showing that the effect of the feeling of guilt
or shame on tax cheating deterrence is greater than the effect of legal sanctions); Harold G.
Grasmick & Wilbur J. Scott, Tax Evasion and Mechanisms of Social Control: A Comparison
with Grand and Petty Theft, 2 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 213, 223 (1982) (showing that feelings of
guilt have a greater effect on tax evasion deterrence than the threat of legal sanctions).
182. See, e.g, ERICH KIRCHLER, ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY OF TAX BEHAVIOUR (2007); Erik
Hoelzl et al., Enforced versus voluntary tax compliance: The “slippery slope” framework, 29
J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 210 (2008); Erich Kirchler, The art of dodging, FINANCIAL WORLD (JuneJuly 2015), at 43 (putting forth theories that treat tax compliance as a contained social
problem).
183. See Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1781 (2000) (discussing tax compliance through the lens of the signaling model and
social norms).
184. See, e.g., Andreoni et al., supra note 165; Grasmick & Bursik, supra note 181;
Grasmick & Scott, supra note 181; James Alm & Benno Torgler, Culture Differences and
Tax Morale in the United States and in Europe, 27 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 224 (2006) (discussing
tax compliance in terms of a country’s “tax morale”); Michael R. Welch et al., “But
Everybody Does It . . .”: The Effects of Perceptions, Moral Pressures, and Informal Sanctions
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populations of individuals has been practiced in most countries for barely a
century.185
These features of the existing literature imply that existing theories
of tax compliance may have neglected two institutional foundations of
modern tax collection. The first is the business firm, which performs most
of the compliance obligations under all modern taxes.186 Ironically, those
scholars who have stressed the business firm’s significance in tax
compliance have at the same time conceived of it in such as a way (i.e., as a
mechanical information depository and transmission device) as to give it
very limited explanatory power.187 The second is the modern legal system,
as embodied by institutions that play legislative, regulatory, enforcement,
and adjudicatory functions, and as animated by the social norm of
compliance with the law. The key to understanding tax compliance may
precisely lie in understanding how individual behavior is mediated by these
two types of institutions. I now describe how such an explanation would
work.
V.

FIRMS AS SITES OF SOCIAL COOPERATION ORDERED BY LAW

Consider the postulate that in modern (i.e., industrial and postindustrial) economies, most business firms operate, for the most part, in
compliance with the law. If this is true, then an important social scientific
question will be why it is true — what has brought about this state of affairs.
But let me clarify first what the postulate means and what follows from it, if
it is true.
The claim that most modern business firms mostly comply with the
law is meant to convey the following two ideas. First, most firms operate in
ways that are constrained by a wide range of legal rules and norms. That is,
a firm makes its decisions while heeding most of the requirements of contract
law, tort law, property (including intellectual property) law, and other
relevant bodies of private law. It also attends to the relevant requirements of
various bodies of regulatory law, such as those regarding public and
workplace safety, labor and employment, environmental protection,
financial prudence and disclosure, and so on. This does not mean that the
firm is necessarily perfectly compliant with the law. Far from it.
Volkswagen may systematically install illegal “defeat devices” in its diesel
engines to dodge the Environmental Protection Agency’s emission tests.188
on Tax Cheating, 25 SOC. SPECTRUM 21, 29 (2005) (“[S]tudies have examined the effects of
moral obligation on taxpayer compliance.”).
185. KKS, supra note 3, at 225 (Figure 2).
186. See supra Parts I-II.
187. Kopczuk & Slemrod, supra note 39.
188. Hotten, supra note 177.
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But this could happen while the company at the same time conscientiously
follows all kinds of other legal requirements imposed by Germany and the
United States. Wells Fargo may put intense pressure on retail branch
employees to meet sales targets, knowing that this had led to and would
continue to lead to the creation of fake customer accounts, but the bank
meanwhile could very well be highly compliant in its tax and securities
filings.189 In other words, for many firms that purposely engage in one type
of illegal behavior or another, they nonetheless are acting in compliance with
a wide range of other applicable laws. They do not cheat “wherever they
can,” in the sense of exploiting every opportunity to earn an expected profit
by violating the law.
Second, while some business firms may be better behaved than
Volkswagen and Wells Fargo, others are of course more ill-behaved. Some
firms act in dodgy ways in respect of many legal requirements. But it may
be plausible to classify these firms into several categories. To begin, there
are the very small firms — indeed in economists’ use of the term, a “firm”
could be a sole business proprietor. A small firm’s behavior would not be
distinguishable from the behavior of its few individual owners or employees,
and there is little intra-firm organization or coordination. Alternatively, a
frequently law-dodging firm could be large, but we expect it to be one that
is otherwise uncompetitive in the market it operates: it needs to cheat
wherever possible just to survive.190 Finally, there are of course firms that
are formed deliberately to commit fraud or other crimes. However, putting
this last type of firm aside, and even considering small firms and firms under
intense competitive pressure and the fact that these firms are more likely to
act in disregard of the law than others, the following seems to be true: few
firms are organized with the expectation that it would deliberately profit
from the violation of all laws that are profitable to violate, and few firms
grow and remain competitive by profiting from illegal activities. This is
what I mean by the claim that most modern business firms mostly comply
with the law.
Having explained the meaning of the claim, I now explain one
crucial consequence of it. The claim implies that most modern business
firms would not make decisions about tax compliance in the way that KKS’
model suggests: they do not decide to comply with the tax law only when an
internal collusive bargain about how to divide the spoils of tax evasion
cannot be sustained. Instead, complying with the tax law, like complying
189. Davidson, supra note 177.
190. See Hongbin Cai & Qiao Liu, Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence
from Chinese Industrial Firms, 119 ECON. J. (LONDON) 764 (2009) (arguing that market
competition increases incentives for Chinese firms to engage in tax avoidance activities);
Andrei Shleifer, Does Competition Destroy Ethical Behavior? 94 AM. ECON. REV. 414 (2004)
(illustrating how unethical conduct can be a consequence of market competition).
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with other bodies of laws, is the default option. If a firm is generally
compliant with the law, then compliance with the tax law should simply be
expected. Specific firms may be engaged in non-compliance with the tax
law at specific times, but such behavior is to be explained in the same way
as one would want to explain why Volkswagen decided to install its “defeat
devices,” and why Wells Fargo pushed its employees towards fraudulent
practices. In other words, when the baseline expectation is compliance,
specific instances of non-compliance are what require explanation, not the
multitude of instances of compliance.
Here, it should be noted that KKS’ model has a common structure
with the Allingham and Sandmo model of individual tax compliance: the
taxpayer, whether a firm or an individual, always confronts a meaningful
choice between complying and not complying with tax law, and it would
choose to comply only when the expected penalty for non-compliance is
large enough.191 Moreover, this choice is conceived in a way that could
characterize choices about whether to comply with any other body of law: as
long as the expected rewards of non-compliance outweigh the expected
punishment of non-compliance, non-compliance should be observed. The
empirical postulate above about modern business firms’ general tendency
towards law compliance precisely contradicts the premise of these
theoretical models.192 It claims instead that modern business firms are
generally law-abiding, or at least enough of them are for tax and other
regulatory systems generally to function.
However, making this postulate is not the end, but only the
beginning, of social scientific inquiries. The important social scientific
191. KKS, supra note 3, at 229 (Proposition 2).
192. There is an obvious analogue of this objection to the KKS model for the Allingham
and Sandmo model. The latter model is famously inspired by Gary Becker’s economic model
of crime: when Allingham and Sandmo conceptualize an individual taxpayer’s compliance
decision, they portray the person in a way similar to a criminal weighing the costs and benefits
of a crime. Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169 (1968). However, Becker did not set out to explain why ordinary people do not commit
crime by his economic model: his economic theory of deterrence is intended only to apply to
criminals. Allingham & Sandmo, on the other hand, conflate the ordinary taxpayer deciding
what to enter on his tax return and a criminally-minded person ready to cheat on his taxes
where possible. Allingham and Sandmo, supra note 162, at 323 (citing studies of the
economics of criminal activity as relevant to “the individual taxpayer’s decision on whether
and to what extent to avoid taxes by deliberate underreporting[,]” implying the irrelevance of
the distinction between a typical taxpayer and a criminal). That is to say, they elide the
distinction between the ordinary person and the criminal in depicting the rational choice about
tax compliance. Id. Whether this is a plausible depiction of the average taxpayer’s
psychology is controversial. Those who favor the Allingham and Sandmo model presumably
find the characterization more (or at least no less) plausible than representations of the average
taxpayer as pro-social, conscientiously law-abiding, and simply oblivious to the potential
rewards of cheating. The argument I make in this Part does not require one to take a position
directly on this controversy.
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question is not why, given the default choice of cheating, most (large) firms
don’t cheat on their taxes. It is rather why these firms may not even consider
cheating on their taxes — why cheating is not their default choice. A number
of theoretical and historical considerations suggest that there may be genuine
answers to this question, and that it does not just offer a rhetorical
reformulation of the seemingly intractable controversy about what produces
compliance on the part of individual taxpayers.
The first theoretical consideration is that firms generally form in
order to earn some economic rent.193 If there is no economic rent to be made,
one can simply purchase and sell in the market and there is no need to form
a firm.194 However, if firms are generally formed with the purpose of earning
rent given market prices, then there is no need for firms already formed to
further exploit profits from violations of the law. It is true that some illegal
activities can be conducted only through firms (e.g., certain Ponzi schemes,
VAT carousal fraud, etc.).195 But it is also the case that most illegal activities
can be pursued without forming firms. Therefore, if a firm is formed not in
order to profit from illegal activities, but with the purpose of earning rents
from other identified opportunities, then it would not be surprising if the firm
does not maximally exploit opportunities arising from illegal behavior; that
is simply not its purpose.
193. See generally G.C. Archibald, Theory of the firm, in THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (Lawrence Blume & Steven Durlauf eds., 2d ed. 2005) (reviewing
theories of the firm and the role of quasi-rent in such theories); OLIVER. E. WILLIAMSON, THE
MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE (1996) (illustrating that firms are distinguished by firmspecific assets that generate quasi-rent); Oliver D. Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the
Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (1989) (providing an overview of how
economists think about firms); Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the
Firm, 4 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 119 (1988) (proposing that a firm can be thought of as arising out
of the incompleteness of contracts); D. Bruce Johnsen, The Quasi-Rent Structure of Corporate
Enterprise: A Transaction Cost Theory, 44 EMORY L. J. 1277 (1995) (asserting that corporate
financial claims can reveal the net value of a firm in alternative uses); Benjamin Klein et al.,
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.
LAW ECON. 297 (1978) (considering the economic costs of forming a firm); Joseph T.
Mahoney & Lihong Qian, Market Frictions as Building Blocks of An Organizational
Economics Approach to Strategic Management, 34 STRAT. MGMT. J. 1019 (2013) (using a
theory of rent-generating market frictions to explain the existence of the firm); Oliver E.
Williamson, Examining economic organization through the lens of contract, 12 IND. CORP.
CHANGE 917 (2003) (examining firms from the perspective of transaction cost economics).
194. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (explaining that
firms form to reduce transaction cost and earn profit that could not be earned through market
transactions).
195. See, e.g., GIANLUCA FIORENTINI & SAM PELTZMAN (EDS.), THE ECONOMICS OF
ORGANIZED CRIME (1995) Vimal Kumar & Stergios Skaperdas, On the Economics of
Organized Crime (University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, Working
Papers No. 70815, 2008), http://www.economics.uci.edu/files/docs/workingpapers/200708/skaperdas-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/TRX8-XR5Z] (giving background about the structure
of organized crime organizations);.
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A second consideration, which is both theoretical and historical in
nature, is that much of the modern legal system is concerned with how to
divide up the rent earned by firms among the contributors to the firm —
employees, lenders, equity investors, suppliers and customers.196 This is
what corporate and other organizational law is about.197 It also forms an
important part of the substance of employment, labor and securities law.
That is to say, social cooperation that is centered on a firm inherently
presupposes ways of dividing up the surplus from cooperation, and the legal
system appears to have been deeply involved in facilitating this division and
thus enabling firm-centered cooperation. Therefore, firm-centered social
cooperation is a paradigmatic form of “legal order” — social cooperation
mediated by legal norms.198
A recent study by Suresh Naidu and Noam Yuchtman of nineteenth
century labor market institutions in the United States vividly illustrates this
consideration.199 Naidu and Yuchtman examine a part of U.S. history (1850
until the early 1920s) when labor markets were still largely unregulated.200
They first show that firm-specific rents were frequently observed in urban
American labor markets: when firms experienced positive output price
shocks, their employees earned wage premia, relative to other employees
with very similar skills in the same urban labor market.201 They then argue
that the existence of rents in the labor contract created space for bargaining
and conflict between employees and employers: strikes became sharply
more frequent in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, often
involved physical coercion against replacement workers, and were correlated
with higher workers’ wages.202 On their side, employers occasionally called
in the police and military to break strikes, but more frequently and equally
effectively sought judicial injunctions to end strikes.203 In other words, even
before the advent of labor and employment regulations, both the coercive
196. See, e.g., MASAHIKO AOKI, THE CO-OPERATIVE GAME THEORY OF THE FIRM (1984)
(modelling how managers facilitate cooperation game among capitalists and workers to
achieve institutional rent).
197. Marco Becht et al., Corporate Law and Governance, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 829-943 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, eds. 2007).
198. For the concept of a legal order as opposed to social cooperation governed by other
types of social norms, see Gillian Hadfield & Barry Weingast, Microfoundations of the Rule
of Law, 17 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 21 (2014).
199. Suresh Naidu & Noam Yuchtman, Labor Market Institutions in the Gilded Age of
American History (NBER Working Paper No. 22117, 2016).
200. Some European countries had already adopted labor regulations at the time. See,
e.g., William E. Forbath, Courts, Constitutions, and Labor Politics in England and America:
A Study of the Constitutive Power of Law, 16 & .L SOC. INQUIRY 1, 22-25 (1991) (discussing
the history and evolution of English labor law in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries).
201. Naidu & Yuchtman, supra note 199, at 9-11.
202. Id. at 11-12.
203. Id. at 17-20.
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apparatus of the state and judicial institutions were called upon to resolve
intra-firm conflicts. Subsequent labor and wage regulations that began to be
adopted at the state level in the early twentieth century and at the federal
level as a result of the New Deal are clearly more permanent legal institutions
that allowed firm-centered social cooperation to continue.204
In other words, reliance on the legal system — and in particular on
the regulatory apparatus of the state — may be essential to the growth of the
modern business firm as we know it. Compliance with legal rules and norms,
and monitoring the compliance of other parties, are intrinsic aspects of the
modern business firm as an institution. From this perspective, the basic
reason that large firms are more likely to be compliant is not that the
probability of motivated whistleblowers is higher in them (or that they have
greater external visibility). The potentially more important reason is that the
firms grew larger because they were profitable, and the participants in them
are more interested in the orderly division of profits than the disorder implied
by cheating (on taxes and other regulatory matters). While the keeping of
business records and proper accounting practices form a part of this
cooperative process, their main benefit for tax compliance may arise not
from facilitating effective audits by the government, but from the fact that
they allow participants in a firm to monitor one another in assessing whether
the expectation of fair divisions of profits is fulfilled.
This conjecture seems consistent with the history of modern taxation
in different industrial economies. In the United States, for example, the
adoption of the “mass income tax” began in 1939 and the withholding of
income tax on wage payments — the administrative institution that scholars
previously focused on — began in 1943.205 Both were pre-dated by the
adoption of withholding of Social Security taxes in 1935.206 To track the
roots of income tax compliance in the United States, therefore, one needs to
explain why business firms complied with the Social Security excise on
employers and with the even earlier legal requirements (enacted in 1909) to
pay corporate income taxes.207 Previous tax legal scholarship has suggested
that the corporate income tax was conceived from the beginning as at least
in part a device for regulating large U.S. corporations, and this regulatory
impulse was also manifest in corporate and antitrust law developments at the
same time.208 But just as relevantly, corporations and employers in general
204. Id. at 20.
205. Desai, supra note 16, at 865, 896. Notably, the previous version of wage
withholding, introduced in 1860, involved the withholding only by the federal government as
employer, not by business firms. Id.
206. Id. at 889-96.
207. Id. at 882.
208. See, e.g., Reuven Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the
Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193 (2004) (describing the origins of the corporate income
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had already been subject to other forms of regulation to facilitate the
formation of American financial and labor markets.209 By the time the
corporate income tax was put in place, whether to comply with the law was
presumably neither a new question nor one that businesses could easily give
a negative answer to if they were to continue to operate at all
In summary, it seems that as a matter of actual history, two
interrelated institutions might have represented the central components of
the foundation of modern tax collection. The first is the business firm. The
second is the set of legal rules and norms that developed from the eighteenth
to the twentieth century that accompanied the growth of the corporate form:
organizational law, antitrust and securities regulation, and labor and
employment law, in addition to the ever-present bodies of contract, property,
tort, and other private law. Because the operation of most business firms
was inseparable from the implementation and following of legal orders, the
decision to comply with the tax law was a natural one for firms to make.
Upon these foundations, both business taxes and taxes imposed on
individuals but remitted by businesses evolved, with withholding, third-party
reporting, other administrative devices, and legal doctrines that guide the use
of such devices all emerging simultaneously. Self-reporting, audits, and
other methods of enforcing the tax law were always important to tax
collection, just as they were important in securing compliance with other
types of law applicable to firms. But most firms in most circumstances may
also have displayed a substantial degree of voluntary compliance, insofar as
the laws they followed enabled social cooperation in the context of the firm
in the first place
Three features distinguish the foregoing account of modern tax
compliance from previous accounts. First, the explanation is institutional:
it refers to specific institutions, social practices, and legal norms. By
contrast, much of the social scientific literature on tax compliance, like the
Allingham and Sandmo model, is psychological and predicts social behavior
from assumptions about individual psychology (the only institutions
assumed are tax return filing, auditing and the imposition of penalties). The
benefit of the institutional approach is that it allows us to focus on explaining
why rational, self-interested individuals may engage in cooperation in

tax, particularly the regulatory rationale behind its conception); Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory
as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 449 (2001)
(dating the “dual system of business taxation in which corporations and partnerships receive
disparate treatment” back over a century).
209. Mark Aldrich, History of Workplace Safety in the United States, in EH.NET
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS HISTORY (Robert Whaples ed., 2001),
http://eh.net/encyclopedia/history-of-workplace-safety-in-the-united-states-1880-1970/
[https://perma.cc/CT4Q-G7EM].
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specific contexts, instead of explaining why they are generally willing to
cooperate.
Second, while other scholars have also emphasized the importance
of the firm as a crucial institutional component of modern tax compliance,
under the account given here, there is much more going on in firms that is
potentially of interest to tax auditors than just the keeping of business records
and accounting books. Instead, firms are places where members of society
actively cooperate under regimes of law. Instead of gaming the system
where they can, individuals pursue profit and bargain for rent within the
confines of law. This approach has strong support from economic theories
of the firm,210 and allows the psychological theories of compliance to be
enriched by the theoretic and empirical literature in organizational
economics.
Third, the account captures the intuition of many that there is nothing
special about tax compliance per se, vis-à-vis compliance with other aspects
of the law; it should be explainable by the same motivations. However,
instead of postulating general pro-social, norms-respecting motivations for
individual taxpayers, the account suggests that they will be motivated to act
this way, in respect to many types of law, in the context of the firm. It is
worth noting here that using TPIR to explain modern tax compliance would
provide one with no purchase in explaining most other types of compliance
with the law. As suggested above, the conception of business firms as
passive and mechanical depositories and transmission devices for taxpayer
information has no analogue in other literature.211 Seeing business firms as
institutions within which individuals can cooperate in an indefinite range of
ways while being regulated by an indefinite range of legal norms, by
contrast, not only constitutes a generalizable theory of tax compliance but
also gives such theory greater plausibility.
VI.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Understanding the institutional foundations of modern taxation has
deep policy implications both for developing countries aiming to enhance
their state capacity212 and for developed countries like the United States
aiming to improve tax compliance.213 This Part offers a preliminary
discussion of how the perspective developed in the preceding Parts suggests

210. See supra notes 193-97.
211. See, e.g., Vandenbergh, supra note 179 (attempting to draw analogies between tax
compliance and compliance with environmental regulations, in which third-party information
reporting plays no role).
212. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
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policy directions different from what scholarship focused on TPIR would
recommend.
A. Implications for Developing Countries
There is no doubt that in any country, when the level of tax
compliance is low, tax collectors thirst for taxpayer information. It is thus
hard to overstate the appeal to developing countries of the notion that hightax, advanced economies have designed institutions for transmitting and
making use of massive amounts of taxpayer information. If such information
gathering devices can be adopted, they would be effective substitutes for
voluntary compliance. Taxpayers would have no choice but to obey the
law.214 A technological approach to tax administration would then help many
poor countries overcome the weaknesses of their institutions.
As much as recent scholarship on TPIR has encouraged this
notion,215 this Article has argued that it is fundamentally untenable.
Promoting the forms of TPIR that are commonly adopted in developed
economies is unlikely to dramatically enhance tax administration capacity in
developing countries for the following reasons. First, the standard forms of
TPIR adopted by developed countries apply to the collection of the personal
income tax on wage and passive financial income.216 But all available
evidence suggests that developing countries already deploy similar
administrative devices — especially withholding — for such tax bases. For
example, Leslie Robinson and Joel Slemrod examined whether developing
countries use information reporting or withholding less than developed
countries by systematically coding comparative information about tax
administration published by the OECD.217 They analyzed, for each of 47
countries: (1) the total number of income categories for which tax is withheld
and remitted by the payer; (2) the total number of categories of income that
are subject to information reporting; and (3) the extent to which taxpayer
identification numbers (TINs) are used as measured by the total number of
payment types that use TINs.218 It turns out that all of these variables are
negatively correlated with a country’s GDP per capita: the poorer countries
use withholding, information reporting, and identity-matching more than the

214. Kleven et al., supra note 11, at 689-691.
215. See supra notes 9-14, 34-41 and accompanying text.
216. See supra Part I.
217. Leslie Robinson & Joel Slemrod, Understanding Multidimensional Tax Systems, 19
INT’L TAX PUB. FIN. 237 (2012). The comparative information covers 30 OECD and 17 nonOECD countries for the year 2005. The 17 non-OECD countries include, among others,
Brazil, India, China, Malaysia, Russia, and South Africa.
218. Robinson & Slemrod, supra note 217, at 243.
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wealthier countries.219 They thus observe: “In higher-income countries, the
revenue body uses withholding and reporting on fewer types of income.” 220
Similar studies done by the IMF also suggest that many developing countries
heavily rely on withholding.221
It is thus very unlikely that developing countries are not attuned to
the wide use of withholding and TPIR for the personal income tax in
developed countries. Instead, the problem is much more likely that they have
far smaller tax bases comprising wage and passive financial income: their
formal employment sectors and financial institutions are more underdeveloped.222 The important question is then whether TPIR has proven to be
useful in the experience of developed countries, outside the context of these
particular components of the personal income tax. As Parts I-III have shown,
the answer is no. TPIR has had only limited application in the individual
business income context,223 and its utility for increasing compliance in such
a context is still open to debate.224 Moreover, such limitation may have
universal explanations (e.g., in terms of when market participants keep
mutual identities) invariant to developmental contexts.225 In addition,
developed countries rarely use TPIR in connection with other important
modern taxes.226 It would clearly be a mistake to infer – from the fact that
219. Id. at 251. Robinson and Slemrod also use factor analysis to construct a single
variable that summarizes tax administration features of a country, which they label “Dispersed
Responsibility” and which they view as capturing “the extent to which the tax collection
system disperses responsibility and the direct compliance burden away from the tax authority
to the taxpayer and third parties such as employer withholders.” The same negative
correlation with GDP per capita obtains for this variable. Id. at 249.
220. Id. at 251. Robinson and Slemrod only analyze income tax administration. The wide
adoption of the VAT, and the dominance of VAT revenue over not only personal but also
corporate income tax revenue in many developing countries, would further strengthen the
quoted observation. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 2.
221. See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, Revenue Mobilization in Developing Countries 31
(prepared by Fiscal Affairs Dept.) (Mar. 2011), https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011
/030811.pdf [https://perma.cc/DG97-RSG3] (finding receipts from the personal income tax
in developing countries come almost entirely from wage withholding on large enterprises and
public sector employees); see also id. at 41 (noting advance collection on imports is common
in Africa).
222. See Gordon & Li, supra note 45 (hypothesizing that low levels of financial
development substantially determine the tax structures of developing countries); Jensen,
supra note 44 (showing limited size of formal employment sectors in developing countries).
See also discussion supra Part II.D.
223. See supra Part III.A-B.
224. See supra Part III.C.
225. See supra Part III.B. See also Carrillo et al., supra note 11 (arguing that in
developing countries, TPIR may be ineffective due to its incompleteness and because
taxpayers can always evade on the margins where government verification is difficult;
Carrillo et al. thereby imply that this is not the case in developed countries, which is incorrect).
226. See supra Part I.
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wage and personal financial income constitute larger tax bases in developed
countries – that developed countries use TPIR in a wider variety of ways
than (or in substantively different ways from) developing countries.227
As argued earlier, developed countries to a very large extent rely on
businesses to withhold, remit, and pay most taxes.228 Voluntary business
compliance lies at the foundation of TPIR, not the other way around.229
When businesses comply with the tax law, the government can afford to be
somewhat indifferent about whether information on individual taxpayers is
collected or analyzed. Tax administrators from developing countries are in
fact likely to be quite familiar with this logic. Developing countries
generally rely far less on the personal income tax and social security
contributions for revenue than developed countries; the corporate income
tax, VAT, turnover taxes, and other business taxes collectively represent a
much greater portion of the tax take.230 One could thus say that business
firms are the main source of revenue for developing countries. What, then,
differentiates between tax administrations in poorer and in richer countries
— what, from the perspective of law enforcement and compliance, explains
the striking difference among them captured by political economists?231
This Article has suggested the following answer. The growth of
business firms in developed countries has been closely intertwined with the
regulatory state, in that the latter has played a crucial role in facilitating the
division of economic profit within business firms. Within the institution of
the modern firm, rational, self-interested individuals are able to engage
profitably in a whole range of economic cooperation, in key part because
they can rely on regulatory mechanisms to ensure that the benefits of
cooperation are divided in ways that are bargained for. For this reason,
participants in the firm are often willing to commit resources to compliance
with regulations and the law in general. This dynamic has evolved to a point
that firms generally do not consider non-compliance with tax law as their
default option; after all, the tax law is generally enacted and enforced by the
same governments that have enacted and enforced the other legal rules that
are crucial to the cohesion of firms. What distinguishes richer and poor
227. Developing countries may make less use of TPIR, as opposed to withholding, insofar
as their governments are less likely to make non-observable characteristics of taxpayers
determinative of tax liabilities. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
228. See supra Part I.
229. See supra Part II.B.
230. Richard Bird & Eric Zolt, Redistribution Via Taxation: The Limited Role of the
Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627 (2005); Gordon & Li,
supra note 45.
231. See KKS, supra note 3 (modeling how TPIR by employers may sustain tax
enforcement, despite low fines and audit rates, as economic development affects the structure
of firms to promote verifiable book evidence and large numbers of employees). See also
supra Figure 1.
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countries, therefore, is that in the former there are more firms that operate in
this mode, both because of the greater development of markets and because
of the deeper involvement of governments in sustaining these markets.
Such an analysis clearly implies that the effectiveness of tax
administration depends on exogenous factors — factors that fall outside tax
administrators’ control. Improving tax administration must of necessity be
viewed in a holistic manner. While information gathering and enforcement
aimed at producing deterrence are always important, tax collection will also
inevitably be a matter of relying on, contributing to, and, importantly, not
disrupting social cooperation centered on business firms that are ordered by
legal and regulatory systems. Deterrence cannot substitute for voluntary
compliance. Therefore, one must be cautious about adopting any instrument
of deterrence if it would undermine voluntary compliance.232 This provides
new support to the idea that rule of law norms are important to tax
administration.233
B. Implications for the U.S. and Other Developed Countries
Third-party information reporting, only to a slightly lesser extent
than withholding, has become a deeply entrenched feature of personal
income tax administration in the United States and other advanced
economies.234 The expansion of TPIR in the U.S. to include broker reporting
of the tax basis of securities and credit card and electronic settlements of
merchants,235 although still largely unrivaled by other countries, is not
altogether surprising. Not only do the costs of the new reporting
requirements now seem acceptable and not overly onerous, the issuance of
1099-Ks and similar forms will likely be embraced by an ever-growing
population of taxpayers, as the forms help taxpayers to keep clear records
and thereby reduce compliance costs.236

232. Another way of putting this is that the chief lesson for tax administrators from the
investigation of the institutional foundations of modern taxation is not so much about what to
do as it is about what not to do.
233. See THE DELICATE BALANCE: TAX, DISCRETION AND THE RULE OF LAW (Chris Evans,
Judith Freedman, et al. eds., 2011) (exploring the tension between the necessary discretionary
power of tax administration authorities and the rights of taxpayers to have that power
governed by the rule of law); Wei Cui, Administrative Decentralization and Tax Compliance:
A Transactional Cost Perspective, 65 U. TORONTO L.J. 186 (2015) (providing an account of
how tax collection may proceed in the absence of voluntary compliance and the distortions to
tax policy this generates).
234. See generally RETURN-FREE SYSTEMS, supra note 65 (providing a comparative
review of the practice of final withholding on wage income and financial income).
235. See supra notes 18-20.
236. See Oei & Ring, supra note 18 (making recommendations for more effective tax
administration and compliance incentives for gig economy workers based on studying the tax
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None of the arguments in this Article are meant to suggest that the
U.S. should roll back any specific type of TPIR that it currently adopts, or to
deny that TPIR may have assorted benefits for taxpayers. Nor do I advocate
against any specific way of expanding the scope of TPIR. If the arguments
in Part III.B are correct, there are likely to be natural limits of TPIR,
expansion beyond which may generate substantial jumps in compliance
costs. But the magnitude of such costs will clearly depend on the
technologies available. If, for example, few American consumers and
businesses use cash or even credit cards in the future, but instead rely on
newer technologies (such as Blockchain) to execute payments, it may be that
even instantaneous transactions will begin to leave digital trails that would
identify the transacting parties and the amount and nature of transactions.
Should the IRS want to collect such information to limit under-reporting of
business income by self-employed individuals, it would probably be able to
do so more easily (and with less political resistance) than today.
But such speculations about how future technology might reduce tax
evasion are misguided, for at least two (related) reasons. First, it is highly
likely that new technologies will transform markets and economies, leading
to substantial changes in the tax policy instruments that societies adopt. In
other words, the main tax bases in future economies will likely be different
from the tax bases today.237 To imagine how future technology might solve
tax administration problems that exist only relative to the tax bases we have
today is an odd form of futuristic exercise. Second, unless technology by
itself could guarantee large-scale social cooperation, it seems implausible to
imagine that in future societies there will not be criminals, free-riders, and
norm violators. Presumably, technologies are developed to enable most
cooperative humans to reap greater cooperative gains. They are not designed
to make non-cooperation impossible. Therefore, criminal and free-riders
will find new ways to cheat, and it will be completely irrelevant that they
cannot cheat by exactly the same means as they do today.
Overall, that is, tax administration in the future (for those who care
to think about it) will depend on a wide range of social institutions and
circumstances, just as, as this Article has argued, twentieth century taxation
has relied on the business firm and modern regulatory law. To improve tax
administration today, one needs to better understand what the most relevant
factors determining compliance are today. This Article has suggested a
direction in which to look that is very different from prior scholarship.

issues and challenges encountered by ridesharing service drivers).
237. As some obvious examples: capital gains taxation may be replaced by mark-tomarket income taxation. Better information about behavioral patterns of individuals may also
lead to new forms of excise taxation.
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CONCLUSION
The arguments of this Article aim to enable one to see how modern
governments can practice “taxation without information.”238 This is exactly
the opposite of what some recent political economy scholarship (and much
conventional wisdom within legal scholarship) suggests to be the basic logic
of modern taxation.239 With no institutional foundation, it may be true that
there can be “no taxation without information.”240 But modern taxation is
not devoid of institutional foundation. The co-evolution of business firms
and systems of regulatory law in industrial economies is likely to have laid
very robust foundations for compliance with the law, which enabled the
United States and many countries to quickly increase their levels of taxation
in the twentieth century, sometimes within the space of a few years,241 at a
time when modern computing technology was still at its infancy.
Modern taxation involves massive social cooperation: governments
are put in place on the basis of systematic transfers of wealth.242 The
deterrence model of tax compliance purports to explain taxpayers’
participation in such social enterprise by how they might be punished for
free-riding.243 If social cooperation in general can be explained simply by
reference to how free-riders are deterred, the social sciences would be in a
very different place from where they stand today.244 Conversely, if the
emergence of social cooperation in human societies cannot be explained by
simple detection and punishment mechanisms, it is not clear why
government and taxation should constitute an exception. From this
perspective, the Allingham and Sandmo theory of tax compliance is clearly
inadequate, as is the insistence that recognizing the role of TPIR would
salvage the Allingham and Sandmo model. But merely identifying
psychological attitudes that characterize normal, compliant taxpayers in
advanced economies also does not do justice to the historical, cross-country,
and even within-country variations in the level of tax compliance. The
understanding of tax compliance — and arguably of compliance with
modern regulatory law in general — must be more firmly grounded in the
understanding of a wider range of institutions.

238. KKS, supra note 3, at 225 (Figure 2).
239. See sources cited supra notes 12 and 16.
240. Pomeranz, supra note 9, at 2539.
241. KKS, supra note 3, at 225 (Figure 2); supra note 41.
242. See sources cited supra notes 2, 3.
243. KKS, supra note 3; Allingham & Sando, supra note 162.
244. See generally John E. Roemer, How we cooperate . . . perhaps (Apr. 2, 2015)
(unpublished working paper, on file with Yale University) (providing a recent review of the
social science literature on human cooperation).

